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Chechen Scholars on Chechnya 
Introduction  
Julie Wilhelmsen 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this publication is, as the title indicates, to give Che-
chen scholars the opportunity to present to the English-speaking world 
their version of what has happened to Chechnya. Over the years, a 
great many books and articles dealing with this tiny republic in the 
Russian Federation have been published in Western academia, but we 
seldom hear from Chechen scholars. It is high time for them to take 
part in the discussion.  
 
It might be easier to achieve a more ‘objective’ analysis of a conflict 
from the outside: however, those caught up in a conflict have not only 
the right to give their version, they also have a particular credibility 
when doing so. The scholars presented here have tried to remain in 
place at the Chechen State University in Grozny through these past 
twenty years of upheaval and war. Surely they have been as close to 
the object of study as it is possible to come. 
 
For scholars working in a peaceful, pluralistic society it is easy to be 
critical and balanced. That is our mandate; it is what is expected of us. 
In a setting of war and ensuing authoritarianism, however, adhering to 
these virtues can be costly and even dangerous. The fairly balanced 
character of the accounts in this volume is therefore no trifling matter. 
It testifies to the personal integrity and quality of the authors. It also 
gives hope that Chechen academia can survive despite constant at-
tempts at politicization.      
 
Abbas D. Osmayev is a Candidate of Historical Sciences and Associ-
ate Professor at the Chechen State University. He has published 
widely on Chechnya and the Caucasus in both a historical and current 
perspective. His chapter presents a broad outline of the second Che-
chen war from its beginning in 1999 until 2005. It traces the military 
operations, the so-called political settlement and the installation of the 
Kadyrov regime, with the subsequent ‘Chechenization’ of the conflict.  
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Despite the top–down structure of the chapter, with a focus on Mos-
cow’s policies, the core story here is that of the Chechen civilian 
population. Osmayev consistently draws into his account the devastat-
ing effects of the war between federal forces, separatists, Kadyrovtsy 
and Radical Islamists on the Chechen people. Building on this, the 
article explains something which has always been difficult to under-
stand for the outsider: the initial legitimacy enjoyed by the Kadyrov 
regime. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the war-weary Che-
chen people supported Akhmad Kadyrov because he promised not 
only to fight the Radical Islamists but also to defend the population 
from the unspeakable atrocities of the federals.  
 
However, the transfer of control to a Chechen regime did not make 
things much better. The Kadyrovtsy received a mandate for indis-
criminate use of force – and they used it. The war turned into a civil 
war. Despite the widespread impression that the cycle starting with 
war, continuing with a political settlement and ending with ‘Che-
chenization’ has resulted in some kind of resolution of the conflict, 
this article shows how the war seems set to go on, and on. At the end 
of the chapter, Osmayev notes that several former separatists were 
elected into the 2005 Chechen parliament, and that can give a certain 
hint in the direction of concord. But we are still left with the uneasy 
feeling that there will be no peace in Chechnya until a true process of 
reconciliation has been carried through and the grievances of the peo-
ple have been addressed from the top of the Russian political system. 
Today’s regional authorities in Chechnya are nowhere close to launch-
ing such a process of reconciliation. Their authority is still built on 
guns. As for the federal authorities, acknowledgement of their respon-
sibility for the grave atrocities committed against Russian citizens in 
Chechnya is urgently needed.  
 
Tamara U. Elbuzdukayeva is a Candidate of Historical Sciences and 
Associate Professor at the Chechen State University. Elbuzdukayeva 
writes on social and economic developments in the North Caucasus 
and has published widely on these issues in the early Soviet period. 
Her contribution to this publication is an historical analysis of the 
economic development of the Chechen republic since the beginning of 
the Soviet rule and until the present. 
 
Elbuzdukayeva’s point of departure is the immense consequences of 
the Civil War upon the Chechen economy at the beginning of the cen-
tury. She then describes how the industry was repaired by the state, 
and how the early Soviet regime went about turning Chechnya into a 
developed, industrialized oil-producing republic. Throughout her 
analysis, Elbuzdukayeva is concerned with how the macro-economy 
affected ordinary citizens, and she pays specific attention to the situa-
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tion of Chechen women during Soviet rule. Elbuzdukayeva also de-
scribes the effects of the Second World War on the economy of the 
Chechen republic. The 1940s were a time of great destruction, but also 
of great activity in the republic. 
 
The final and most substantial part of the chapter deals with the after-
math of the two Chechen wars in the 1990s. Elbuzdukayeva details the 
catastrophic consequences the warfare for the Chechen economy. She 
makes it clear how the grave social problems facing the Chechen 
population today are closely linked to the devastation of the economy, 
and argues that these problems cannot be solved without rebuilding 
and developing the entire Chechen economy, from heavy industry to 
the agricultural and social sectors.  
 
Vakhit Kh. Akayev is a Doctor of Philosophy and Professor at the 
Chechen State University, and is also a member of the Chechen Acad-
emy of Sciences. Akayev has published widely on Chechen history, 
culture, society and religion. In this chapter Akayev makes a case for 
ordinary Chechens as Sufi Muslims and not Radical Islamists. After 
so many years of ‘terrorist talk’ framing Chechnya as a bastion of 
Wahhabism, such a comprehensive account of the various forms of 
Islam in the region is indeed pertinent.  
 
Akayev explains the Islamization of the peoples of the North Cauca-
sus, and looks into the recent Islamic revival during perestroika and 
glasnost. He pinpoints how traditional religious and ethnic identities 
are closely entangled and also shows how religious structures and 
politics are intertwined. Sufi brotherhoods have been instrumental in 
mobilizing regime support, but they also wield influence over political 
actors. Likewise, neo-Wahhabi ideas influenced the Dudaev regime, 
but the regime also employed religious slogans for its own purposes. 
 
Akayev’s detailed and informative account emphasises the syncretic 
and changing character of religion in the region. He notes the misuse 
of key terms and distinctions in writings on Chechnya and tries to give 
words such as taip, vird, Wahhabi clear content and definition. As 
such, his chapter is a reply to other writers in the field but can also 
serve as an excellent introduction for those seeking a deeper under-
standing of the social and religious fabric of Chechnya.  
 
The main focus of his chapter is the challenge that the conflict be-
tween traditional Sufi Islam and neo-Wahhabism poses to Chechen 
society. Neo-Wahhabism, a recent arrival, actually contradicts tradi-
tional Sufi Islam in a fundamental way, but the war provided fertile 
ground for these radical ideas. The conflict inherent in the different 
teachings of Sufism and neo-Wahhabism is underscored by a genera-
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tional cleavage between the younger generation, who did not experi-
ence the deportation of the Chechens to Central Asia – an experience 
that in many ways constituted the Chechens as a nation – and the older 
generation that did. It is the younger generation who endorse neo-
Wahhabi ideas and are drawn into the ranks of the Jamatist groups. 
The conflict between traditional Sufi Islam and neo-Wahhabism has 
long since left the level of theological debate, and is being played out 
in the fight for power and positions, very often taking on violent ex-
pression. 
 
Despite Akaev’s expressed optimism concerning the positive effect of 
the massive propagandistic counteroffensive launched against neo-
Wahhabism in the region in recent years, he seems to believe that the 
only way to achieve stability in the long run is through establishing a 
dialogue between those representing traditional Islam and those repre-
senting neo-Wahhabism in Chechnya. 
 
We welcome the opportunity to give these scholars the opportunity to 
make contact with a broader public. At the same time, it must be 
stressed that the views expressed here, as well as any shortcomings in 
the material, are the responsibility of the individual authors. Finally, 
we would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
financing the project which made this publication possible. 
The Chechen Republic:  
From ‘Counter-Terrorist Operation’ to 
Peace (1999--2005) 
Abbas D. Osmayev 
 
 
 
 
The events of the past decade have again put the Chechen Republic in 
the world news limelight. Chechnya has become the subject of re-
newed discussion (albeit without much success) on the part of such 
international organizations as the UN, OSCE, PACE, the Council of 
Europe, and influential human rights organizations, in addition to the 
parliaments and presidents of various democratic countries. 
 
This article focuses on the events of 1999–2005: From the beginning 
of the second war, disguised under the euphemism of an ‘anti-terrorist 
operation’, right through to the election of the parliament, which final-
ized the formation of the governmental authorities of the republic. 
Along the way, the people of the republic have had to live through air 
and artillery shelling, ‘cleansing’ and terrorist attacks, kidnappings 
and arrests, a pathetic imitation of democratic procedures, and har-
assment on the grounds of nationality and religious cleavages. To this 
day, not all the causes and driving forces of the events in Chechnya 
are fully clear, a fact which surely bears some connection with proc-
esses within the general Russian context and in the world at large. 
Before the ‘second war’ 
In the summer of 1999, Chechen and Dagestani Wahhabis and radi-
cals united to form the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan. 
Their efforts were directed at inciting an ‘Islamic Jihad’ in Dagestan, 
as the next step towards the ‘complete and irreversible emancipation 
of the Caucasus from oppression by Russia’. In fact, the ‘invasion’ of 
the Tsumadin and Novolak (Auhovsky) regions by Wahhabi armed 
groups and the uprising among Dagestani Wahhabis in the 
Karamahinsk ‘triangle’ in August 1999 were the true reasons behind 
the start of the second Chechen war. The fact that the ‘invasion’ of 
Dagestan has been scrutinized and researched by various politicians 
and researchers subsequent to this can be explained by various factors, 
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as Aslan Malashenko has outlined in his Islamic landmarks of the 
North Caucasus.1 Among these he notes the provocation so master-
fully rigged by the Kremlin, which resulted in the ultimate defeat of 
the Chechen faction, as well as the fact that the autumn escalation of 
federal victories contributed to the victory of the pro-Putin ‘Unity’ 
political party in the December 1999 elections to the State Duma, in-
evitably opening the way to the presidency for Vladimir Putin in 
March 2000.  
 
It has been hypothesized that there was some collusion between the 
Kremlin and Shamil Basayev, who agreed to sacrifice himself, in view 
of his impending defeat, to ensure the success of Vladimir Putin. Ac-
cording to another theory, Shamil Basayev, whose earlier efforts had 
not met with success in Chechnya – he had failed to achieve the con-
solidation of society, sideline his competitors (first and foremost, 
Aslan Maskhadov) from the political arena, or obtain foreign financial 
aid to facilitate economic recovery – decided now to boost his author-
ity beyond the borders of the republic through of a new successful 
military operation. That would at the same time enable him to confirm 
his claim that his political and spiritual aura extended to other repub-
lics as well. The reasons for Basayev’s militant action could also be 
seen as fulfilling the desire of the Chechen elite – more precisely, the 
‘Wahhabi’ part of the Chechen elite – to elevate the idea of an Islamic 
state to a higher, more regionally-based level. In other words, to at-
tempt to make such a state a reality on the basis of Chechnya and 
Dagestan, with the possibility of incorporating Ingushetia into the ar-
rangement at some future point. (Malashenko 2001, p. 154)  
 
It is worth noting that President Maskhadov and his supporters de-
nounced the Wahhabis’ invasion of Dagestan (contrary to the allega-
tions in official Russian propaganda). At the same time, the head of 
Ichkeria failed to take any real measures aimed at halting the military 
provocation organized on the territory of which he was head of state. 
A thorough analysis of the situation, publications in the mass media, 
and the recollections of eyewitnesses and participants in the second 
war all indicate that Russia’s security services were aware of the 
preparations being made for the ‘invasion of Dagestan’ – all the more 
so because undercover secret service agents had infiltrated the militia 
to the extent that they numbered among the units’ crew. However, to 
bring about a resolution of the political crisis in Russia, a straightfor-
ward transfer of control over this particular situation was apparently in 
the interests of Russia’s ruling elite. That is how the editor-in-chief of 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vitaly Tretyakov, explained the causes of the 
‘invasion’:  
 
                                                 
1  A. Malashenko. Islamic landmarks of the North Caucasus. Moscow: Gandalf, 2001. 
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It is completely clear that the Chechens in Dagestan were circum-
vented here, having been given the chance to mess up this affair in or-
der to secure a legitimate opportunity to restore the federal govern-
ment in the Republic ... It is clear that this was a Russian secret service 
operation (not to confuse this affair with the bombing of houses), and 
that it was politically sanctioned at the very highest level.2  
 
On 2 August, 1999 fighting broke out in the Tsumandinskiy district of 
Dagestan. Two days later, shooting began in the Botlikh district of 
Dagestan, and a helicopter was hit in the mountainous Chechen vil-
lage of Kenkhi. The official statements by Moscow and Grozny about 
the events in Dagestan completely contradicted one another: Moscow 
claimed that detachments of Chechen militants had been deployed into 
Dagestan, while Grozny denied any involvement on the part of Che-
chens in these events.  
 
Meanwhile, in Moscow, the government of Sergey Stepashin, who did 
not want to unleash a major war, was sent into retirement, and on 
9August, Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister, 
also identifying him as his successor as the President of Russia. 
 
During the events of the summer of 1999, the absence of a mature 
civil society in Chechnya became acutely apparent, as well as the lack 
of any real political parties. While feeling the imminence of war and 
despite the fact that an absolute majority of the population of Chech-
nya were against its occurrence, there existed no organization that 
could feasibly express their collective will or that was capable of pre-
venting the negative development of the situation in the region. In 
Grozny, rallies were held in opposition to a new war, but very few 
people participated: they felt that their opinion could not change any-
thing, and that certain parties had huge vested interests in the occur-
rence of such a war. 
Military operations  
On the evening of 25 August 1999, Russian planes bombed the vil-
lages of Serzhen-Yurt, Benoy, Kenkhi, and Vedensko Ushelie. On 27 
August, Vladimir Putin flew to Dagestan, where he presented awards 
to local militiamen. Two days later, military operations were launched 
in the Kadar zone (in the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and 
Kada) mainly involving the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of the Russian Federation. On the night of 4 September, a house where 
the family of a military serviceman were living was blown up, in the 
town of Buinaksk. Just a day later, on 5 September several hundred 
militants penetrated Dagestan from Chechnya and came to occupy 
                                                 
2  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 October 1999. 
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several villages in the Novolak district. For some reason, there were 
no Russian military units in the area, although they had previously 
been stationed there. On the night of 6 September, the Russian air 
force bombed villages in the Nozhai-Yurt and Gudermes districts, 
which resulted in dozens of people being killed and wounded. 
 
On 9 September 1999, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with the 
Mufti of the North Caucasus. Also in attendance at the meeting was 
Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Akhmad Kadyrov, who, 
earlier on, had strongly condemned the armed provocation in Dages-
tan and was a staunch opponent of the development of the so-called 
Wahhabism in Chechnya. 
 
In my view, neither the August nor the September fighting in Dages-
tan incited public support within Russian society as regards the idea of 
sending Russian troops into Chechnya. However, the bombings of 
apartment buildings in Moscow on 7 and 13 September, both of which 
were attributed to the Chechens, triggered an explosion of anti-
Chechen hysteria, with new air raids and shellings of Chechnya, and 
numerous arrests of Chechens in Moscow and in other Russian cities. 
On 14 September, at a meeting of the State Duma, Vladimir Putin de-
clared a temporary quarantine around the perimeter of the Chechen 
border. Four days later, he declared that Chechnya was a terrorism-
controlled zone, where a ‘surgical operation’ was needed to excise this 
disease. He indicated that he would work actively with the Chechen 
diaspora – up to and including the formation of a government in exile. 
 
On 20 September in Magas, the capital of Ingushetia, a meeting was 
held between President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev, Aslan Mask-
hadov, and the President of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, 
Alexander Dzasokhov, resulting in a call for a meeting to take place 
between Boris Yeltsin and Maskhadov. However, no decisive steps on 
the part of the leadership of the Russian Federation were taken in or-
der to respond to this appeal. A representative of President Yeltsin 
stated that a meeting would be possible on condition that Aslan Mask-
hadov refused to have anything to do with Chechen criminal factions 
and that he should take concrete measures towards their detention, ei-
ther singlehandedly or together with Russian federal armed forces. 
 
On 23 September, a new round of bombing attacks on Chechen terri-
tory began, including the bombing of the airport. It was on this day 
that Vladimir Putin made his much-cited statement, ‘we will wipe out 
the terrorists even in the outhouse’. Aslan Maskhadov tried to arrange 
a meeting with the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of 
Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedov, but on 30 September this meet-
ing was prevented from taking place, allegedly due to indignant resi-
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dents of Dagestan, who had closed off the roads. Thereby the flywheel 
of the war was launched, and all avenues that might have prevented 
this from happening were blocked. 
 
In September, the mass exodus of refugees from Chechnya had al-
ready begun. By the end of the month, there were about 10 thousand 
people in Ingushetia alone. Other regions of Russia did not accept the 
refugees.3  
 
On 2 October, the Chemists’ House of Culture in Grozny hosted the 
Congress of the Chechen People, convened by Aslan Maskhadov.4 
Congress participants collectively adopted a resolution condemning 
terrorism, expressing their condolences with respect to the victims of 
the bombings in Moscow and other cities, and putting forward pro-
posals for a peaceful settlement to the situation. In the case that these 
proposals were not accepted, Aslan Maskhadov would have to form a 
State Defence Committee, declare martial law in Chechnya, and pre-
pare for an impending war. Nevertheless, on 2 October, Russia pro-
ceeded to launch ground operations. Units of the Russian army en-
tered the village of Borozdinovskaya on the border with Dagestan, 
while land forces advanced 8 to 10 km into the territory of Chechnya 
via the Nogai steppe. 
 
During September 1999, even before any large-scale land operations 
had begun, the Russian air force carried out air strikes on Grozny and 
its suburbs and the villages of the Nozhai-Yurt, Vedeno, Gudermes 
districts. Most victims of these bombings and missile strikes were in-
nocent civilians. That was also the case in the village of Elistanzhi in 
the Vedeno district, where, as the result of an unprovoked air strike on 
7 October 1999, the number of those killed or wounded totalled 48 
people. On 21 October, about 200 others died and over 400 were 
wounded as a result of tactical ‘ground-to-ground’ ballistic missile 
strikes carried out on the central market of Grozny, a maternity hospi-
tal and a mosque in the village of Kalinin.5 Russia's military and po-
litical officials initially denied any involvement – but Moscow offi-
cials later amended their statements, declaring these were the results 
as a targeted explosion and that the ‘operation was carried out by non-
military means and without the use of artillery and aviation’. Moscow 
has since maintained a de facto policy of keeping silent about these 
events, not to mention any punishment of the perpetrators. 
 
                                                 
3  The saga with respect to refugees from Chechnya deserves a separate study. 
4   Author’s note: it is unknown by whom and how the delegates were elected. 
5  ‘Targeted strikes’. Preliminary report of the Memorial Human Rights Centre. Moscow: 
Zvenya Publishing House, 1999, p. 7. 
Julie Wilhelmsen and Erika Fatland, eds 16 
The bombing, shelling and rocketing of cities and villages of Chech-
nya triggered a mass exodus of the population; however, as noted, the 
only republic willing to receive the refugees from Chechnya was In-
gushetia. By 11 October 1999, the number of refugees had reached 
146 thousand people according to official statistical data. Eventually, 
on 22 October, units of Russia's ‘Zapad’ military group, under the 
command of General Vladimir Shamanov, closed the border crossing 
between Chechnya and Ingushetia. On 26 October, the Russian media 
reported that, as of 29 October, traffic to Ingushetia would be open 
through the ‘Kavkaz-1’ checkpoint on the Rostov–Baku highway. In 
fact, entry to Ingushetia was not permitted. A refugee convoy that had 
been turned back by officers was then subject to an aerial attack near 
the village of Shaami-Yurt. More than 20 people were killed and doz-
ens were injured, some of whom later died. This killing of innocent 
civilians has gone unpunished, just as with the hundreds killed before 
them and the thousands to be killed afterwards. The Russian authori-
ties have even denied that any bombing of a refugee convoy took 
place. 
 
At the same time that the outbreak of military operations in Chechnya 
was occurring, there began the systematic and gross violation of hu-
man rights against Chechens throughout Russia, during what was 
known as operation ‘Vikhr-anti-terror’ (translates as ‘Anti-terror vor-
tex’). This practice was enforced especially in Moscow and the Mos-
cow Region. The ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre and the 
‘Grazhdanskoe Sodeistvie’ (‘Civic Assistance’) NGO organization 
have reported on and provided evidence to show how Russian law en-
forcement agencies practised arbitrary treatment and abuse of power 
towards persons of Chechen and Ingush ethnicity.6 
 
On 12 October, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov issued a decree 
authorizing the dismissal of Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov from his post for 
having spearheaded militant activity in the eastern part of the republic, 
as well as organizing rallies and calling upon the population to strug-
gle against adherents of the Wahhabi fundamentalist Muslim move-
ment. 
 
Already in mid-October, Moscow was trying to deal with issues of 
civil administration in the territories where it had managed to take 
control. On 15 October, Moscow appointed a Special Representative 
of the Government of the Russian Federation to the Chechen Republic 
with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister, in the person of Nikolai 
Koshman. Within the scope of the representative office, the Interim 
                                                 
6  ‘Discrimination on grounds of place of residence and ethnicity in Moscow and Moscow 
Region. August 1999–December 2001’. Report of the ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre 
and the charitable organization ‘Civil Support’. Moscow, 2001. 
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Administration of the Chechen Republic was established. In late Oc-
tober, Bislan Gantamirov was released from prison in Russia, at which 
time he, with the support of the Russian military, began to undertake 
the formation of units of the Chechen police, which were to participate 
in the storming of Grozny.  
 
By the end of December, the lowlands of Chechnya had come under 
the control of the Russian military. On 26 December, military opera-
tions began, aimed at capturing Grozny. The corresponding attacks 
involved up to 20 thousand troops, effectively unleashing a new round 
of war. 
 
Fighting continued in almost all districts of Chechnya, with the excep-
tion of those in the northern part of the republic. On 9 January, Che-
chen armed groups counter-attacked, and penetrated the settlements of 
Shali, Argun, Germenchuk and Mesker-Yurt. In the centre of the city 
of Shali, a Russian military missile attack killed nearly 150 people, 
most of whom were civilians, while all of the settlements occupied by 
the Chechen militants were not subject to blockades by Russian troops 
during the fighting. 
 
By the end of January 2000, Russian troops had claimed control of a 
large part of Grozny, which was blasted to ruins in the course of the 
missile strikes, air and artillery attacks. Russian forces were neverthe-
less unable to suppress the resistance put up by the armed formations 
of the Chechen Republic of Icherkia, while they were operating at 
squad level. In a coordinated effort, on the night of 31 January and 
early morning of 1 February 2000, the main force of Chechen troops 
attempted to break past the encirclement around Grozny and proceed 
towards the villages of Alkhan-Yurt and Alkhan-Kala. Russian gener-
als G. Troshev and V. Shamanov claim that this was, in fact, an opera-
tion carried out by federal security services that finally managed to 
push the Chechen militants to the west, where hundreds of the Che-
chen radicals were then killed, including many of the most prominent 
commanders.7 In fact, however, most of the Chechen troops managed 
to escape by way of the villages Alkhan-Kala – Zakan-Yurt – Shaami-
Yurt – Katyr-Yurt – Gekhi-chu, along which route Russian troops car-
ried out powerful aerial and artillery strikes, including the use of TOS-
1 Buratino multiple-rocket launchers (area bombardment system), 
with numerous civilian casualties. Subsequent to this, many males, 
aged 16 to 50 years, were arrested in these settlements, as well as 
throughout Chechnya, on suspicion of involvement in ‘illegal armed 
formations’. In connection with these arrests and the heavy-handed 
treatment of a ‘Radio Liberty’ correspondent, A. Babitsky, the atten-
                                                 
7  G. Troshev. My War. Moscow: Vagrius, 2002, p. 305. 
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tion of Russian society and that of the world public became focused 
on the camp in the Chernokozovo Naursky district, where the Russian 
military carried out torture, beatings, and even extrajudicial execu-
tions. In total, according to the media, there were at least 20 camps in 
Chechnya and in the adjacent areas in which residents of the republic 
were detained. 
 
One of the most pressing problems was the ratio of the number of 
units of Russian armed forces compared to the number of civilians in 
the region. The first disturbing reports about this, thanks to M. Saidul-
layev, were received from the village of Alkhan-Yurt, where, in De-
cember 1999, 40 civilians were killed and the village itself was sub-
jected to outright looting. 
 
The lack of prosecution of perpetrators encouraged a massive surge in 
the number of crimes carried out against the civilian population of 
Chechnya. In February 2000, for instance, in the village of Aldy and 
in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, massacres were commit-
ted against innocent civilians – but not as a result of aerial or artillery 
strikes, where there is room to speak about possible errors. No, these 
deaths were a result of deliberate ‘cleansing’, in line with the wide-
spread practice of extrajudicial killings.8  
 
In mid-February 2000, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the 
Russian Federation opened a criminal case against the president of the 
Chechen Republic of Ishkaria, Aslan Maskhadov. He had previously 
been accepted by Russian politicians, at least in words, as the legiti-
mately elected head of the republic, and as someone with whom it was 
possible to hold negotiations. 
 
Intense fighting continued throughout February 2000, with as many as 
150 aircraft sorties on some days. On 29 February, Russian Minister 
of Defence Igor Sergeyev reported to Putin that ‘the actual military 
part of the operations has been completed’. However, only a few days 
later, on the outskirts of Grozny, several officers of the Moscow Re-
gion OMON were mistaken for Chechen militants and were killed in 
an ambush set by federal forces. In the village of Ulus-Kert, troops 
from the Pskov Airborne Division were also killed. Military operati-
ons on a large scale – even judging by the standards of the war in 
Chechnya – began in the village of Saadi-Khutor (Komsomolskoe), in 
the Urus-Martanov district. The fighting lasted until 20 March. Attest-
ing to the level of intensity is the fact that a TOS-1 Buratino multiple-
rocket launcher was used during the battle in Saadi-Khotur, as well as 
a UR-77 Zmei Gorynych mine-clearance vehicle, and Tocha-U short-
                                                 
8  ‘Cleansing operations’. Report of the ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre. Moscow: Zvenya 
Publishing House, 2000. 
Chechen scholars on Chechnya  19 
range tactical missiles. Various estimates put the total death toll 
among Chechen militants at between 600 and 1500 fighters9 and about 
120 Russian soldiers. The village itself was completely destroyed. 
This was the last major battle in the second war, after which the Che-
chen paramilitary groups relied on greater use of guerrilla warfare tac-
tics. 
A political settlement -- Kremlin-style  
Against the backdrop of sharp criticism on the part of Western coun-
tries about Moscow’s policies in Chechnya, the Russian leadership 
decided to make arrangements so that residents of Chechnya could 
vote in the upcoming presidential elections of the Russian Federation. 
Among the candidates for this position was Umar Dzhabrailov, a 
businessman of Chechen origin, who was registered in Moscow – 
most likely a puppet, selected to demonstrate that Chechens enjoy 
equality of legal rights within the Russian Federation. Upon visiting 
Chechnya, the OSCE delegation concluded that there was a total lack 
of the generally accepted conditions for holding elections and for pre-
electoral campaign activity. Nevertheless, the elections were held. In-
deed, according to official figures, 79.41% of the total electorate of 
the Chechen Republic took part in the election, in which over 50% of 
the vote was for Vladimir Putin. On 27 March 2000, the second day 
after the presidential elections, a total of 90 sorties were flown, and 
Putin reiterated that the fighting in Chechnya would continue. Inciden-
tally, exactly two weeks prior to the elections, the Russian secret ser-
vices took the notorious Chechen field commander Salman Raduyev 
prisoner. In late March, Colonel Yuri Budanov, commander of the 
160th tank regiment, was arrested on charges of raping and murdering 
an 18-year-old Chechen woman, Elza Kungayeva. His trial dragged 
on for a long time before he was finally convicted, and with great dif-
ficulty, as the colonel was even acknowledged to be insane. That was 
in fact the position most advantageous of the Russian government, as 
reflected in statements of Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, who met 
with the editors of five leading newspaper in Russia, stating, ‘But as a 
human being, yes, a I am also sympathetic towards him [Yuri Buda-
nov]. If you would like, Budanov is a victim of circumstances, and the 
shortcomings of the legislation that exists today ... And he, as a com-
mander, could not see how his soldiers had to kill and kill ...’10 This 
text should make it clear why, of the thousands and thousands of the 
crimes and killings committed in Chechnya by representatives of the 
Russian security forces, the total number of cases resulting in a con-
viction does not even amount to fifty. 
                                                 
9  This figure is difficult to pinpoint because of evidence that corpses were also brought here 
from other parts of Chechnya. 
10  Trud-7, 17 May 2001. 
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During March 2000, a number of active and retired Russian politicians 
repeatedly raised the question of introducing ‘direct presidential rule’ 
in the Chechen Republic. Numerous heads of administrations and the 
administrative commandants of the districts in Chechnya approached 
Putin on 27 March to request such a form of rule in Chechnya. Ini-
tially, the Kremlin seemed somewhat favourably inclined, but it is 
highly probable that it abandoned the idea upon realizing that it might 
lead to the president being subject to an intense wave of criticism. 
 
On 15 April, the Russian government announced that the military part 
of its counterterrorist operation had been completed. The idea of hold-
ing negotiations with Maskhadov was actively promoted in Russian 
and foreign media alike. The radio station ‘Radio Liberty’ (RFE) even 
presented its version that the arrest of Apti Batalov, former Chief of 
the Chechen presidential administration, had been made as part of the 
preparations for such negotiations. It is possible that the catalyst for 
such rumours was the decision taken at the April session of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whereby Russia was 
stripped of its voting rights in relation to Chechnya policy.  
 
May 2000 was marked by minor skirmishes between Russian units 
and Chechen forces, with the media reporting virtually on a daily basis 
with reference to the number of casualties among the militants, which 
typically numbered in the dozens for every one or two Russian sol-
diers that were reported either killed or wounded. Press reports also 
provided coverage about the so-called ‘sweeps’, in which dozens of 
young men were detained ‘on suspicion of involvement in armed 
gangs’. Such ‘mopping-up’ operations carried out among the popula-
tion of Chechnya have been generally associated with widespread and 
arbitrary arrests, looting, extortion, torture, the destruction of the 
homes of families that had members in the Chechen armed forces. Ar-
eas subject to such ‘cleansing’ or ‘special operations for verifying the 
passport regime’ included Grozny, Argun, Urus-Martan, and villages 
located in the districts of Tsatsan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, Starie Atagi, 
Novie Atagi, Chiri-Yurt, Avtury, Serzhen-Yurt, and Vedeno, in addi-
tion to others in the territory between the Sunzha River and the Black 
Mountains, where the majority of the population is concentrated in 
Chechnya.  
 
The outcome of these ‘special operations’ was massive public discon-
tent, demonstrations, and protests. Even the Head of Administration of 
the Chechen Republic, Akhmad Kadyrov, stated that the continued 
practice of massive ‘cleansing’ could lead to popular indignation and 
public outrage – in which case he would be forced to recognize that 
the people are human, and he would also remain on the side of the 
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people.11 All these factors, coupled with appeals to the international 
community, led Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov to issue Direc-
tive no. 46, as well as Order no.80 of the Commander of the Com-
bined Forces in the North Caucasus, governing conduct to be applied 
during ‘special operations’.  
 
Nevertheless, with few exceptions, operations continued according to 
the same regime of lawlessness. In November 2002 alone, during such 
‘sweeps’, 29 people were killed in the Urus-Martan district, in addi-
tion to 18 people in the Kurchaloi district, 20 people in the Shali dis-
trict, and numerous casualties in the regions of Vedeno, Gudermes, 
Nozhai-Yurt, and Shelkovskoy.12 Among the many murders and extra-
judicial killings carried out in this region, some incidents stand out: 
the deaths of five students from the Chechen State Polytechnical Insti-
tute as a result of gunfire by a Russian military unit in the ‘Olympic’ 
neighbourhood in Grozny on 20 December 20; the mass shooting of 
seven civilians by soldiers from Russian special forces near the village 
of Samashki on 14 June 2001; and an incident involving the main in-
telligence directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation, in which its officers shot and burned six civilians, 
including pregnant women, on 11 January 2002 in the village of Dai.  
 
In every one of these instances, the identities of the offenders are well 
known, but the jury in their trials, held in Rostov-on-Don, demon-
strated a determined stubbornness to acquit them (the cases of Ulman, 
Arakcheyev and Khudyakov, etc.). The Ulman case still has not been 
transferred to the military collegium of the court, but even before re-
ceiving his sentence, Ulman fled and, at present, is allegedly being 
sought by Russian law enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, in its 
press release, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic stated: 
‘no exceptions are being made, and the genuine equality of citizens 
before the law will be provided for. The Military Prosecutor has 
agreed to produce 132 criminal cases involving crimes that have been 
committed by soldiers against civilians.’13 
 
By mid-May and early June, the Chechen troops were able to recover 
from the heavy losses they had incurred in the winter-spring of 2000. 
They began to liaise better and coordinate their actions amongst them-
selves. This was evidenced by the attacks subsequently carried out on 
checkpoints and on commandants, the detonation of bombs in almost 
all districts of Chechnya, as well as an attempt to kidnap the Mayor of 
Grozny, S. Mahchayev, on 30 May. In June, a series of new explo-
sions marked the beginning of a new kind of activity on the part of the 
                                                 
11  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 September 2000. 
12  Daimokhk (‘Fatherland’), no. 41, 10 December 2002. 
13  Ogra, no. 17–18, 1 May 2002. 
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Chechen militia. On 3 June, an infantry combat vehicle was blown up 
by a ground bomb on the road from Grozny to Shatoi, and on 8 June 
in the village of Alkhan-Yurt, at the site where the Omsk unit of 
OMON was stationed, there were two attacks by suicide bombers, one 
of which involved a woman. In both cases, the bombs were detonated 
in vehicles that were wired with explosives. Explosions bearing simi-
larities to these incidents soon became a common occurrence in 
Chechnya, causing the deaths of hundreds of people.  
 
At the same time as the fighting, ‘cleansing’, shelling and aerial 
bombing was occurring, a search was underway for a strong leader 
who was both loyal to Moscow and also had the backing of the major-
ity of the population in Chechnya. 
 
Since the end of 1999 there had come repeated statements confirming 
the process of rebuilding the economy and the restoration of the social 
sphere in Chechnya. In reality, however, any achievements as of May 
2000 were fairly modest. In the 2000 Federal Russian budget there 
were no items indicating any expenditures on Chechnya in full meas-
ure, with the exception of payments for child allowances in the 
amount of 516 rubles, the creation of a fund to support a plant for 
processing petroleum products and foodstuffs in the amount of 58 mil-
lion rubles, and financial compensation for residential and other kinds 
of property lost during the war, budgeted at 428 million rubles. Ulti-
mately, the financing directed towards the Chechen Republic in 2000 
was based on the reallocation of funds for some planned expense line-
items of the federal budget and on account of extra-budgetary funds. 
Mayor S. Mahchayev reported in late May that an estimated 70% of 
Grozny had been devastated, while not a single penny had been allo-
cated by the Russian government towards the restoration of the city. 
The following day, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Koshman said vir-
tually the same thing, adding that the considerable sums for Chechnya 
that Mikhail Kasyanov had referred to (2.5 billion rubles per month) 
were actually for maintaining the army and the Ministry of the Inte-
rior; the money that so far had been allocated for Chechnya covered 
only the salaries of public servants and repairs to schools, hospitals 
and cultural institutions in the republic. 
 
Significant progress was made in restoring electricity in the republic, 
except in Grozny, as well as the supply of natural gas. Most schools 
began to function again. Here we must note that schooling was never 
interrupted except during periods of actual military operations, al-
though some Russian politicians and bureaucrats like to claim that 
education in Chechnya has been virtually at a stand-still since 1991. 
The institutions of higher education located in Grozny have resumed 
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their work, in large part thanks to the perseverance of their rectors 
(presidents). 
 
On 8 June 2000, President Vladimir Putin signed a Decree and Reso-
lution ‘On the organization of a provisional system of executive au-
thority in the Chechen Republic’. On the same day, the State Duma 
introduced a draft law with the same name. Neither this Decree nor 
any other normative act actually appoints a clearly-identified head of 
administration of the Chechen Republic, though the press widely di-
scussed the potential appointment of Bislan Gantamirov, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov, Akhmad Kadyrov, or Gennady Troshev to this post. The 
possible appointment of Mr. Kadyrov was indicated by the fact that he 
was the only political figure among the potential candidates for Che-
chyna’s leadership to have been invited to Moscow for the presidential 
inauguration of Vladimir Putin on 7 May 2000.  On 12 June, after 
holding out for a period, President Putin signed the Decree appointing 
A. Kadyrov as the Head of Administration for Chechnya. According 
to a statement made by Putin himself, ‘... it was difficult for me to ap-
point him [Akhmad Kadyrov] as the head of the republic. In Russia, 
this appointment is evaluated in different ways. I had to personally 
exert influence here.’14 Akhmad Kadyrov, who, at the beginning of his 
activity, held far less authority than his predecessor Nikolai Koshman, 
started to work steadily and consistently towards transforming his ad-
ministration into full-fledged government of Chechnya ‘capable of 
independently forming its own professional personnel makeup of the 
executive branches in the republic and to exercising control of finan-
cial flows’.15 But in Moscow, the proposals put forward by Akhmad 
Kadyrov were treated with great caution, and nobody seemed in a hur-
ry to boost his status. 
 
The situation in the Chechen Republic itself was far from stable and 
peaceful. Infantry clashes continued, as well as air and artillery stri-
kes, in addition to ‘cleansing’ operations that involved sealing off the 
perimeter around various settlements. More often than not, entry into 
Grozny necessitated spending many hours in queue. People began to 
discover mass graves at the bases of Russian military units or near to 
them; the killing of religious leaders also began at this time. On 3 
July, at Russian security force bases in the cities of Argun, Gudermes, 
and Shali and in the village of Novogrozny, suicide bombers blew up 
trucks that were loaded with explosives.  
 
                                                 
14  Kommersant, no. 123 (2008), 8 July 2000.  
15  Igor Kosikov. ‘The federal centre and Chechnya: a new system of relations in the sphere 
of public administration and economics (the formation of the state apparatus)’ in Chech-
nya: from conflict to stability (the problems of reconstruction). Moscow, 2001, p. 175. 
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The media reported on a meeting held by the leadership of the Che-
chen Republic of Ichkeria, at which time Aslan Maskhadov was given 
additional powers until the end of the war; any decisions taken in any 
branches of government were to be endorsed by him and agreed upon 
with the State Defence Committee. This decision was most likely dri-
ven by the need to protect Maskhadov against impeachment by the 
Parliament of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, specifically by seve-
ral deputies who were loyal supporters of Akhmad Kadyrov.  
 
While armed skirmishes, shelling, air raids, and ‘cleansing’ operations 
were being carried out (as when, on 24 July 2000, Russian military 
forces forced everyone out of the village of Shuani in the Nozhai-Yurt 
district and then began pillaging), the political campaign for elections 
to the State Duma was underway. Back in May that year, Moscow had 
taken the decision to organize these elections, to demonstrate to eve-
ryone in Russia and the rest of the world that the situation in Chech-
nya had become stable enough to allow people to take part in free 
elections. Less significant was who would actually win – the main 
thing was for elections to take place. After the elections, the new de-
puty elected to the State Duma from the Chechen Republic was 
Aslanbek Aslakhanov; already on 29 August, he held a meeting with 
President Vladimir Putin. 
 
The August tragedy of the sinking of the nuclear submarine ‘Kursk’ 
and the subsequent matter of the assistance offered by the state to the 
families of the deceased crew members turned the focus onto the pau-
city of the assistance offered to family members of the Russian mili-
tary killed in Chechnya, not to mention the dearth of assistance to the 
families of the tens of thousands of Russian citizens residing in 
Chechnya who had died and continued to die as a result of shelling, 
shoot-outs, ‘cleansing sweeps’, and extrajudicial executions. This se-
cond issue, however, was only ever posed by the residents of Chech-
nya themselves, and an adequate response has never been given by the 
Russian authorities.  
 
In the second half of 2000 in Chechnya – especially in the steppe re-
gions of the republic, from the right bank of the Terek River to the 
Black Mountains – there was a devastating wave of bloody ‘sweeps’, 
resulting in the forced detention of thousands of people by the Russian 
military. They were subjected to inhumane treatment, humiliation, and 
torture. Following such sweeps, local residents often found mass bur-
ial sites filled with the corpses of those who had been detained only 
days earlier. Such horrendous acts showed a cynical disregard for 
Russian military law on the part of soldiers. In September 2000, the 
new authorities of the Chechen Republic finally pushed Akhmad  
Chechen scholars on Chechnya  25 
Kadyrov to declare that he was losing the loyalty and trust of the peo-
ple, which he had acquired with great difficulty.  
 
Not one day in the autumn and winter of 2000 passed without reports 
of armed clashes, cleansing operations, artillery/air strikes, or raids on 
the central market, inevitably followed by organized plundering. 
Bislan Gantamirov was among the most vocal critics of such tragedies 
and behaviour, though his efforts and complaints met with no success.  
Chechen Civilians: Between a rock and a hard place  
The residents of Chechnya have not only been devastated as a result of 
acts of outrage and despotism on the part of the military: they also suf-
fered at the hands of militants who, purportedly on behalf of a ‘sharia 
court’, took it upon themselves to ‘deal with’ the heads of local ad-
ministrations, the imams of various mosques, and people whom they 
labelled as ‘national traitors’ simply because they did not suit their 
needs.  
 
In January 2001, Vladimir Putin met with Akhmad Kadyrov. The lat-
ter proposed a programme for restoring the economic and social sphe-
res in the Chechen Republic, along with the partial withdrawal of Rus-
sian troops from the republic and an increase in the size of the police 
force in Chechnya. Subsequently, the Russian President signed the 
decree ‘On the system of institutions of executive power in the Che-
chen Republic’, naming Kadyrov as the highest official in the republic 
prior to the occurrence of the elections and Stanislav Ilyasov was ap-
pointed the Head of Government.  Following a decree issued by Presi-
dent Putin, headquarters of the department for combating terrorism in 
the North Caucasus was set up just a few days later, with German 
Ugryumov as its new head. A decision was also taken with respect to 
the reduction and partial withdrawal of Russian troops from Chech-
nya.  
 
The fight against terrorism in the Chechen Republic was mainly car-
ried out by employing ‘sweeps’, and those most affected were un-
doubtedly ordinary civilians. For instance, during a regular ‘cleansing’ 
operation in the city of Argun on 20 January 2001, according to testi-
mony by the city’s deputy mayor, more than 100 people were arrested. 
Eleven of them were never found, and one was later found dead. The 
same military operation involved instances of plundering committed 
against the local population.16 Similar ‘sweeps’, carried out by federal 
forces in the villages of Assinovskaya and Sernovodskaya in July 
2001, received wide publicity.17 
                                                 
16  Aired on Chechen state television, 01 February 2001.  
17  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 July 2001. 
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As to the combined tally of those who fell victim to incidents of mili-
tary outrage and attacks by Chechen militants, data from the Prosecu-
tor’s Office of the Republic indicate that for the first eight months of 
2001 alone, the death toll included 12 senior local officials, 24 po-
licemen and three religious leaders. 
 
Both republican and local governmental authorities were practically 
restored in full, as well as the judiciary; the structure of law enforce-
ment agencies within the republic was also developed. At the same 
time, an Advisory Board was established under the Head of the Che-
chen Administration, one of its tasks being the drafting of the Consti-
tution of the Chechen Republic and the regulatory and legal frame-
work for holding elections. The Government Commission for restor-
ing the social sphere and economy of the Chechen Republic was also 
actively operating. This body was headed by Victor Khristenko and 
Vladimir Elagin, Russia’s minister responsible for coordinating the 
activities of federal executive authorities with respect to the socio-
economic development of the Chechen Republic. 
 
From March 2000, killings of public and social leaders became in-
creasingly frequent, with those targeted including public servants 
serving at the city and village level, imams serving at mosques, and 
law enforcement officers. From 1999 to November 2002, 230 person-
nel from the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Russian Ministry of the 
Interior serving in Chechnya were killed;18 and in 2001 and the first 
three months of 2002, a total of nine imams were killed and one was 
kidnapped. During the same period, 53 violent crimes were committed 
against leaders and employees of the republican and regional admini-
strations, as well as their family members.19 Most of these crimes re-
main unsolved to this day. It is extremely difficult to identify who ac-
tually carried out these horrendous acts or who ordered them, although 
rumours indicate that some of the instances might be attributed to sen-
tences handed down by a sharia court.  
 
On 23 October 2002 in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow, where the 
musical ‘Nord-Ost’ was being performed, a group of terrorists under 
the command of Movsar Barayev took nearly one thousand spectators 
hostage. The terrorists had mined the building and threatened to blow 
it up unless Putin began withdrawing Russian troops from Chechnya. 
While several MPs and journalists were allowed to enter the theatre, 
no substantive negotiations were held as per the terrorists’ demands, 
and their exact demands were not made public. On the night of 26 Oc-
tober, Russian FSB and OMON swat teams stormed the theatre with 
                                                 
18  Daimokhk, no. 36–37, 26 November 2002.  
19  Orga, no. 17–18, 1 May 2002.  
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the use of a poisonous narcotic gas. As a result of the ‘raid’, all the 
terrorists were reported to have been killed. 
 
The evacuation of the hostages was ill-planned. They were taken en 
masse to hospitals about three hours after the gas had initially been 
released through the theatre’s ventilation system. In the end, 130 of 
the hostages were also killed – only five of them killed by the terror-
ists themselves. The others were killed as a result of the botched ‘Op-
eration Freedom’, with roughly 75% of them dying in the auditorium 
itself and the remaining 25% dying en route to the hospital. With re-
spect to those hostages who survived the incident, the health of many 
has also been seriously affected. According to the ‘official version’ 
from Moscow, these people died because of a variety of chronic dis-
orders that had been triggered as a result of being subject to a lengthy 
period without movement, food or water. 
 
Since not a single terrorist is left alive today, no trial with respect to 
the ‘Nord-Ost’ hostage-taking has ever been held. Negotiations with 
the militants were dismissed as impossible; indeed, in my opinion, the 
Kremlin never made any effort to conduct real negotiations. Without 
any clear answers, there remain many unanswered questions in rela-
tion to the militants’ infiltration in Moscow and the theatre in particu-
lar, in addition to the smuggling of weapons and many other out-
standing issues. 
 
One of the least unexplored issues with respect to both wars in Chech-
nya concerns the number of civilians killed. While some estimates put 
the number of dead soldiers at more than three thousand and the num-
ber of militants who died in action at more than 13 thousand (the 
credibility of these figures has been called into doubt), this aggregate 
figure certainly pales when compared to the number of civilian deaths 
during the two wars. The number of civilians who perished at that 
time is estimated at between 40 thousand and 200 thousand people.20 
The reluctance of Russian authorities to clarify the actual number of 
deaths – which would not represent a serious challenge if the political 
will were present – gives grounds for all kinds of speculation, includ-
ing doubts about the figures put forward in the 2002 national census, 
which gives the population of the Chechen Republic as being 
1,080,816 people. On the other hand, one of the most tragic outcomes 
of the two wars cannot be called into question. Because of these wars, 
a total of 2,500 children in Chechnya have been completely orphaned 
and another 24 thousand left with only one surviving parent.21 
                                                 
20  V.A. Tishkov, Society in armed conflict. Ethnography of the Chechen war. Moscow, 
2001, p. 532; Russia's Regions, no. 302, February 2001, p. 8; and Novaya Gazeta, no. 6, 
28–30 January 2002.  
21  Izvestia, 11 December 2002. 
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And yet, there is yet an even graver problem – the disappearance of 
many people following their arrest by various military and armed 
forces under Russian command. In this regard too, estimates of the 
number of ‘the disappeared’ vary significantly. Some quote a figure of 
12 thousand missing persons,22 while others quote 3000 (based on the 
incomplete list from the ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre). The re-
port of the Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation for 2001 
claimed that 940 appeals had been filed with respect to ‘missing per-
sons’ who disappeared in 2000, as well as another 246 appeals in 
2001. In addition, at a meeting of the Chechen Republic Administra-
tion on 20 December 2002, there was mention of ‘more than one thou-
sand people missing’, 170 of whom had been abducted in the course 
of the two months preceding that meeting.23 
 
According to data from the state prosecutor of the Chechen Republic 
as of 1 January 2005, since the time when anti-terrorist operations be-
gan in the region, 1793 criminal cases were opened involving the ab-
duction of 2503 people. In 2004, another 164 criminal cases were 
opened regarding instances involving the kidnapping of 218 persons. 
For 2003 the figures were 419 and 561 respectively. However, of all 
of the criminal cases opened in the republic in this particular category, 
only 63 cases actually reached the courts, involving charges against 97 
accused – this represents only 3.5% of the total number of cases. The 
relatives of the missing people have appealed to the authorities, but 
their complaints and petitions directed towards various federal go-
vernment agencies and administrations have tended to be forwarded to 
the heads of those state authorities about which the complaints had 
been made in the first place – the complaints were either due to offi-
cials’ actions or failure to act in specific regard to these instances.24 
 
A major problem that still remains is the large number of refugees 
found throughout various regions of Russia, as well as in both the 
‘near abroad’ (former Soviet countries) and elsewhere. During the 
summer of 2002, some 77 thousand refugees from Chechnya tried to 
return to their home republic.25 However, the main obstacles – the 
lack of security for the population and the fact that housing has been 
destroyed – have still not been resolved. Even in Ingushetia, the refu-
gee population numbered somewhere between 50 thousand and 130 
thousand at that time.26 
 
                                                 
22  Terra incognita, no. 2, February 2002, p. 16.  
23  Terra incognita, no. 4, p. 40; and TV programme Vesti Chechnskoi Respubliki (Chechen 
Republic News), aired 20 December 2002. 
24  Stolitsa Plus, no. 49, 22 June 2005. 
25  Daimokhk, no. 25, 1 October 2002. 
26  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, no. 259, 3 December 2002.  
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The military operations carried out in Chechnya have resulted in a 
sharp reduction of the populations living in the mountain regions. 
They have effectively been pushed out by their constant subjugation to 
abuse at the hands of both the Russian military and the Chechen mili-
tias. According to the All-Russia population census of 2002, for many 
settlements in the Vedeno district – such as Nizhnie Kurchali, 
Verkhnie Kurchali, Srednie Kurchali, Shirdi-Mokhk, Bouni, Orsi, 
Rikha, Tunzhi-evla, Hoi, Dutz-Khutor, Zhani-Vedeno, and Verkhnee 
Tsa-Vedeno – the populations previously inhabiting these communi-
ties no longer live there. They were forced to leave, as were the people 
of the villages of Yarysh-Mardi of the Grozny district. Very few peo-
ple still live in the Shatoisk and Itum-Kalinsk districts of Chechnya.27 
 
According to information from the Federal Migration Service in the 
Chechen Republic, ‘about 20 families leave our republic every quarter 
... about a quarter of those leaving are destined to places beyond the 
borders of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the number of 
people flowing back into the Chechen Republic is twice more than 
that figure.’28 The largest groups of refugees from Chechnya are now 
living in Europe, especially in Austria, Belgium, Norway, France, and 
the Netherlands. Immigration officials there register people by citizen-
ship and not ethnicity, so no exact figures can be provided. For in-
stance, according to official Norwegian statistics, as of 1 January 
2008, there were 12,823 Russian citizens living in the country,29 
whereas in 2000 there had been only 3000. A considerable part of 
them (between 3000 to 5000 people from Chechnya) have been 
granted residence/work permits, and have jobs. According to our data, 
there are at the University of Oslo and the University of Stavanger 
Chechen students who have also completed secondary school in Nor-
way previous to that. In general, the number of refugees from Chech-
nya in other European countries is estimated at between 50–60 thou-
sand and 100–110 thousand persons. 
 
Many pressing social problems are left for the Chechen Republic to 
deal with today. The number of disabled persons suffering from se-
rious chronic disease now stands at 56,895, and there are 18,404 
children with physical disabilities. The number of disabled persons 
continues to rise, having increased more than five-fold over the past 
five years. The number of children deemed socially vulnerable or ‘at 
risk’ is estimated at 347,743 – that means an incredible 76% of all 
children in the republic. In the second quarter of 2005, unemployment 
stood at 78.7%; the average per capita income was roughly 1400 
                                                 
27  ‘Number and distribution of the population. Results of the All-Russia population census 
of 2002. Statistical handbook’. Grozny, 2004. 
28  Golos Chechenkoi Respubliki, no. 19, October 2005. 
29  http/ /www. ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innibef-en/tab-2008-04-29-11-en.html  
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rubles – and that is more than 1000 rubles below the official minimum 
subsistence level. The number of physicians available to treat the po-
pulation is shockingly low, at just 17.8 doctors per 10 thousand 
people, constituting only 42% of the average figure for the Russian 
Federation as a whole.30 
Chechenization  
Despite the enormous difficulties, the lack of sufficient amounts of 
funding, and the continuation of terrorist attacks in the republic, local 
residents sought to restore tranquillity to Chechnya – and managed to 
do so with great difficulty. On 12 December 2002, President Vladimir 
Putin signed the decree ‘On Approving the Resolution on Holding a 
Referendum in the Chechen Republic on the Draft Constitution of the 
Chechen Republic’ and Bills of the Chechen Republic ‘On the Elec-
tion of the President of the Chechen Republic’ and ‘On the Elections 
to Parliament of the Chechen Republic’. Later, on 4 July 2003, shortly 
before the presidential election in Chechnya, the Government of the 
Russian Federation adopted regulation no. 404, stipulating the formal 
procedures and period for the payment of financial compensation to 
residents of the Chechen Republic whose housing was destroyed and 
who otherwise lost property during the conflict. The compensation 
entitlement specified under this government regulation was 350 thou-
sand rubles. 
 
A tremendous amount of effort went into the preparations for the ref-
erendum. Equally much effort was applied, by both Moscow and 
Grozny, in holding this event. Prior to the referendum, the republic 
was visited by a whole series of leading figures of Chechen national-
ity, including S. Khadzhiev, D. Zavgayev, U. Avturkhanov, U. 
Dzhabrailov as well as many others. 
 
The Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Surkov, promised the republic a wide degree of 
autonomy, but Kremlin spokesperson Sergei Yastrzhembsky explicitly 
set out the choice before Chechnya as follows: ‘either a referendum or 
the continuation of lawlessness’. After arriving in the Chechen Repub-
lic on 13 March, Head of the Presidential Administration Alexander 
Voloshin stated that the referendum would be followed by the begin-
ning of work on drafting a treaty on the delimitation of powers be-
tween the federal authorities in the centre and Chechnya, underlining 
that, although he generally did not support such agreements, this in-
stance represented a special case. On 16 March, President Vladimir 
Putin delivered a televised address to the Chechen people.  
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The referendum was held on 23 March 2003. According to official 
reports, the absolute majority of participants (80%) voted in favour of 
the draft Constitution of the Chechen Republic, as well as the laws on 
the presidential and parliamentary elections. However, these figures 
have been called into question by many human rights organizations. 
According to the official results, virtually all participants in the voting 
process identified the outcome of the referendum with the popula-
tion’s desire and hopes for peace, the rebuilding of the republic, and 
the restoration of their violated rights. Already on 24 March, the day 
after the referendum, upon commenting on the preliminary results of 
the vote, Putin noted that the people of Chechnya had opted for peace 
and a positive development, alongside Russia. ‘We have pulled the 
plug on the last major issue related to the territorial integrity of the 
Russian Federation’, commented President Putin while speaking at the 
Kremlin during a regular meeting with members of the Russian gov-
ernment. 
 
Almost immediately after the referendum, preparations for electing a 
president of the Chechen Republic got underway. Among the numer-
ous figures who came forth as candidates, there were several – 
Aslambek Aslakhanov, Malik Saidullayev, and Khusein Dzhabrailov 
– who might have represented serious competition for Akhmad Kady-
rov in the presidential race. However, for various reasons (not least, 
pressure from the Kremlin), these figures either withdrew their candi-
dacies (as in the case of Aslan Aslakhanov and Khusein Dzhabrailov) 
or  ended up not registering their candidacy (as in the case of Malik 
Saidullayev). According to official sources, 87.7% of eligible voters in 
Chechnya took part in the presidential elections on 5 October 2003, 
with 81% of them voting for Akhmad Kadyrov.31 Some human rights 
activist groups, such as the Moscow Helsinki Group, and even several 
observer countries (particularly the USA, in contrast to the UK) de-
clared that the conduct of the elections in Chechnya had not followed 
international standards, and that they would not recognize the official 
results as legitimate.32 By contrast, the League of Arab States and ob-
servers from other CIS countries claimed that the elections had been 
‘legitimate, free and democratic’.33 
 
Local law enforcement agencies, under the command of Ramzan 
Kadyrov, received very broad powers in elaborating the ‘political set-
tlement’ plan developed and introduced by Moscow. This process was 
based on the Kremlin’s refusal to negotiate with the warring parties, as 
well as the fact that it favoured the creation of republican-level power 
structures and the transfer of certain functions and powers to the Che-
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32  Ibid. 
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chens themselves, including the task of searching for and eliminating 
extremist militants. It was in this way that the ‘Chechenization’ of the 
conflict suddenly emerged, with much of the responsibility for carry-
ing out ‘anti-terrorist operations’ transferred to law enforcement agen-
cies of a kind specific to the republic. This new force, now made up of 
ethnic Chechens, had received a de facto mandate for the indiscrimi-
nate use of violence. 
 
The politics of ‘Chechenization’ has implied a transformation – from a 
situation characterized by conflict with an external party, into an out-
right civil war. As an outcome of this tactical approach, the gradually 
increasing number of local residents involved in the conflict on the 
side of the federally-controlled forces not only suppressed any notion 
that the conflict was rooted in separatist motives, but also effectively 
spared Moscow from being accused of unwillingness to hold negotia-
tions with ‘Ichkeria-mongers’.  
 
The starting point of this ‘Chechenization’ of the conflict can be 
traced back to the referendum on the constitution and the laws on 
holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the republic. An 
increasingly important role in the republic came to be played by le-
gitimately armed units formed from amongst local residents them-
selves. According to estimates from human rights organizations, start-
ing in 2004, the vast majority of civil rights violations recorded in 
Chechnya took place at the hands of officers associated with these re-
cently-introduced law enforcement institutions.  
 
The changing status of Akhmad Kadyrov did not necessarily mean 
that the military immediately vested him with full authority. Instead, 
he won it back from them bit by bit and with great difficulty, by skil-
fully playing on the religious factor. Abductions continued as before, 
becoming one of the biggest problems for both the population and 
civic authorities, which had tried in vain to fight this scourge in 2000. 
Numerous outrageous and highly publicized crimes (author’s note: 
these have still not been investigated) were carried out in late March 
in the village of Duba-Yurt, located in the Shali district. In that month, 
representatives of an unknown federal agency (apart from their own 
cars, the kidnappers also had two armoured personnel carriers) de-
tained eight local residents and removed them from their home vil-
lage. Their corpses were eventually found, all of which exhibited signs 
of torture and targeted gunshots. Their bodies were dumped on the 
outskirts of the village of Serzhen-Yurt on 9 April. Just one day ear-
lier, another tragedy occurred in the village of Rigakhoi. As a result of 
a federal aircraft bombing raid, six people were killed – a mother and 
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her five children34 – in their own home. However, bringing the perpe-
trators in the Russian military to justice, despite every effort on the 
part of the republic’s governmental authorities, has not met with any 
success. 
 
Another serious challenge for Russian citizens of Chechen nationality 
was the anti-Chechen hysteria demonstrated by some politicians and 
media representatives in the wake of an explosion in the Moscow 
metro on 6 February 2004, with numerous casualties. Protests were 
held in many towns and villages across the Chechen Republic, con-
demning terrorism as well as the chronic search for a ‘Chechen foot-
print’ in every major crime occurring in the Russian Federation. A 
week after the explosion in Moscow, another less-publicized explo-
sion took place in Doha, the capital of Qatar. That blast claimed the 
life of the former president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ze-
limkhan Yandarbiyev, in addition to seriously wounding his 13-year-
old son.  
 
Two weeks later, on 28 February 2004, a well-known Chechen field 
leader, Ruslan Gelayev, was killed in Dagestan. In March, former De-
fence Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Magomed Kham-
biyev, surrendered on the basis of guarantees provided by police head 
Ramzan Kadyrov. However, according to media reports, Khambiyev 
decided to give himself up only after his family members has been 
arrested.35 
 
In my view, Akhmad Kadyrov’s appearance on the popular TV pro-
gramme ‘Svoboda Slova’ played an important role in enhancing his 
credibility as President of the Chechen Republic. Speaking on this 
show on 20 February 2004, he said: ‘I must protect my people, who 
have entrusted me with their fate. I will do this, and I will defend their 
rights against both ‘the Feds’ and the bandits’. He summed up by say-
ing ‘I do not want to stop the war; I want to end it.’ 
 
The authorities of the Chechen Republic became actively engaged in 
preparations for and the holding of the Russian Federation presidential 
elections. Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed to head Vladimir Putin’s 
campaign headquarters in the Chechen republic. After the elections, 
held on 14 March, official sources claimed that the incumbent presi-
dent received 92.3% of the vote in Chechnya (equal to 521,317 votes) 
of the total number of voters (564,784) who participated (94% voter 
turnout). The two other key candidates – Irina Hakamada and Nikolai 
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Kharitonov – scored just over 2% of the vote each, while no other 
candidate managed to receive even one percent of the vote.36 It is 
doubtful whether voter turnout really amounted to as much as 94% of 
the eligible voting population, but these are the official figures from 
by the Electoral Commission of the Chechen Republic. According to 
some analysts, the successful outcome of the elections provided 
grounds for Akhmad Kadyrov, within a few days after the election, to 
assure members of the Chechen government that a Chechen oil com-
pany would be created, that the roadblocks would be removed, and 
that Grozny airport could be re-opened. 
 
Soon, however, a heavy blow was dealt to the relatively peaceful de-
velopment of the political situation in the Chechen Republic (with its 
‘cleansing’ campaigns, abductions, armed clashes, and handing over 
militants in hopes of amnesty). On 9 May 2004,  a terrorist attack at 
Dinamo Stadium in Grozny resulted in the death of the President of 
Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, as well as the Chairman of the Chechen 
State Council, Hussein Isaev. Colonel-General Valery Baranov was 
seriously wounded. Many analysts and observers interpreted this as 
marking the end of Putin-led policy within the Chechen Republic. In 
fact, it would appear that the Russian president himself did not share 
that view, since there have come no major policy changes since that 
time.  
 
On 11 May, Vladimir Putin arrived in Chechnya and awarded the Star 
Medal of the Hero of Russia to Akhmad Kadyrov’s son Ramzan, as 
well as presenting the Order of Courage to Rosa Isaeva, which she re-
ceived on behalf of her deceased husband Hussein Isaev. The Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation issued a decree to perpetuate the mem-
ory of Akhmad Kadyrov, noting that he (Kadyrov) had left this life 
undefeated, and that a people who have produced such a son are wor-
thy of respect. Flying over Grozny by helicopter, Putin noted, ‘it looks 
terrible’,37 and instructed Russia’s Minister of Economic Development 
and Trade, German Gref, to deal with the issue of restoring the Che-
chen Republic. 
 
On the last day of the funeral for Akhmad Kadyrov, in his native vil-
lage of Tsentoroi, a ceremonial parade was held, involving all of the 
law enforcement forces and security agencies of the republic, includ-
ing special forces, special intelligence units and policemen. About five 
thousand armed men gathered, indicating that they were in favour of 
appointing Ramzan Kadyrov as the successor to his father Akhmad. 
That same day, the State Council, the Government, the Security 
Council and the Muslim Spiritual Authority of Chechnya approached 
                                                 
36  Stolitsa Plus, no. 22, 20 March 2004. 
37  Izvestia, 15 March 2004. 
Chechen scholars on Chechnya  35 
Putin, requesting that he make an exception by allowing Ramzan 
Kadyrov to run for the post of president of Chechnya. Kadyrov him-
self had categorically stated that he would not run, specifically be-
cause ‘the law and the Constitution do not allow it’,38 although he had 
indicated shortly before that he would listen to the will of the people. 
Interestingly, the decision on the candidacy of Alu Alkhanov, who 
hails from the town of Urus-Martan, was adopted at the gathering on 
10 June in Akhmad Kadyrov’s native village of Tsentoroi. Already on 
15 June, Putin held a meeting with Alu Alkhanov in the Kremlin. Fol-
lowing this meeting, there was practically no doubt about who would 
become the next president of the Chechen Republic. 
 
The militants also sought to take advantage of the sensitive situation 
and carried out a number of violent acts. Among the tragedies were 
the infamous terrorist attack in Ingushetia on the night of 22 June 
2004, armed clashes in the village of Avtury in the Shali district, an 
assassination attempt on Acting Chechen President Sergei Abramov 
on 17 July, and an attack on Grozny on 21 August, along the lines of 
the scenario in Ingushetia. The latter event resulted in the death of 
about 70 officers of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior. Further ter-
rorist attacks came on 24 August, which resulted in two separate pas-
senger planes crashing and a death toll of 89 people. Despite these 
setbacks, preparations for presidential elections in Chechnya contin-
ued, with seven candidates registered. However, Malik Saidullayev, 
who might otherwise have posed serious competition for Alu Alkha-
nov, was not allowed to register his candidacy, allegedly due to a 
passport error discovered by the Elections Commission of the Che-
chen Republic. 
 
On 22 August, the eve of Akhmad Kadyrov’s birthday, Putin flew to 
Kadyrov’s native village of Tsentoroi and, together with Ramzan 
Kadyrov and Alu Alkhanov, laid a wreath on the grave. Thereafter, 
they all flew to Sochi, where, according to a newspaper account:  
 
Alu Alkhanov briefed Vladimir Putin on the socio-economic situation 
in the republic. He identified the main sore point as being the payment 
of financial compensation. Putin called on the Chechen leadership to 
not diminish their attention to the issue of compensation for lost prop-
erty. Vladimir Putin supported the proposal to channel funds from the 
export of Chechen oil towards the restoration of the Chechen Repub-
lic. However, in the event of a positive solution to this issue, Putin 
urged the Chechen leadership to monitor the expenditure of funds 
strictly.39 
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Residents of the Chechen Republic cast their votes in the early presi-
dential elections on 29 August. Only 14 hours later, it was announced 
that elections were to be considered valid, since more than 30% of the 
electorate had participated. The official results, tallied later, were as 
follows: 82.25% of all eligible voters had participated in the elections; 
Alu Alkhanov had captured 73.67% of the popular vote, thereby win-
ning in the first round40. Following the elections, international observ-
ers from the Executive Committee of the CIS issued a lengthy state-
ment, noting that ‘the election campaign was mainly in line with legis-
lative requirements ... we recognize the early election of the President 
of the Chechen Republic as legitimate.’41 However, the position taken 
by the OSCE and PACE was more sceptical. 
 
Only two days after the Chechen presidential elections, a group of ter-
rorists seized school no. 1 in Beslan in North Ossetia and took more 
than a thousand hostages – pupils, parents and teachers. The terrorists 
mined the building and demanded that the Russian President begin 
withdrawing federal forces from Chechnya. Former President of In-
gushetia Ruslan Aushev was permitted to enter the school and man-
aged to get 26 of the hostages released. No substantive negotiations 
were held as to the demands made by the terrorists, nor were the de-
mands made public. During the day on 3 September, there was an ex-
plosion in the school and Russian special forces led an assault, during 
which ‘Shmel’ static flame-throwers were used, as well as tanks. In 
total, 330 hostages were killed, 186 of them children. All the terrorists 
were killed, with the exception of Nurpashi Kulayev, who was cap-
tured by local residents. Upon finally appearing before the court, he 
was sentenced to life imprisonment.  
 
Nevertheless, many questions have remained unanswered to this day – 
not least concerning the terrorists’ actual aims and expectations. It 
seems unlikely that the leaders of the terrorist group, which planned 
the seizure at a time when the ‘Nord Ost’ hostage-taking in Moscow’s 
Dubrovka Theatre was still fresh in Russian minds, really held out 
hopes of negotiations with Russian authorities or that the government 
would concede to their demands. Perhaps their aim was just to cause 
another explosion in the North Caucasus. In Chechnya, many rallies 
were held, condemning the acts of these terrorists and, while the siege 
lasted, demanding the release of the hostages. The leadership of the 
republic appealed to the people of North Ossetia to denounce these 
crimes and offer assistance.42 Later, members of the Chechen Ministry 
of the Interior made a contribution of 5 million rubles as assistance to 
Beslan. 
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After Beslan, the Russian government, acting with direct reference to 
the need to combat terrorism, amended electoral legislation: this in-
volved the cancellation of direct elections for the heads of regional 
administrations and direct elections for MPs of Russian Duma, as well 
as establishing a Civic Chamber. Various other legislative amend-
ments were also introduced. For instance, it was decided that referen-
dums on highly important issues would no longer be held, and that 
parliamentary investigations into the Beslan tragedy could not be 
permitted. Procedures to be followed in conducting public rallies or 
protests were also significantly changed. In essence, they meant the 
curtailment of virtually all the democratic instruments in the country. 
Also, any possibility that might otherwise have existed with respect to 
holding negotiations was effectively buried. At a meeting with foreign 
journalists, Vladimir Putin stressed: ‘no one has a moral right to tell us 
to talk to child killers’, and went on to ask, ‘why don’t you hold a 
meeting with Osama bin Laden?’43 
 
On 5 October 2004, Alu Alkhanov was inaugurated as President of the 
Chechen Republic. We may note that the documents certifying his 
presidency were not awarded by the Chairman of Elections Commit-
tee, as expected, but by Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. 
With the presidency, Alkhanov inherited some heavy baggage – the 
tragic legacy of war, along with a shattered economy and severe social 
problems within the republic. 
 
In January 2005, there was active discussion about a special agree-
ment, jointly developed by the federal central authorities and the lead-
ership of the Chechen Republic, stipulating that, in the course of the 
coming ten years, Chechnya would be able to freely exploit and con-
trol all the natural wealth of its territory, as well as the resources ob-
tained from their use, transportation, and sale. President Alu Alkhanov 
publicly commented on this document, indicating that it should not be 
taken as an incitement to indulgence, but should instead be seen an 
economically sound decision dictated by the need for more intensive 
development and the reconstruction of Chechnya.44 Notwithstanding 
such statements, the final adoption of the agreement was repeatedly 
delayed. It now appears as if the Kremlin had no real intention of 
adopting this document.  
 
Aslan Maskhadov and his entourage also tried to remain in the picture. 
Several media publications reported on the 14 January 2005 order 
from Maskhadov ‘On the unilateral suspension of offensive military 
actions throughout the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
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and beyond its borders for the month of February’. On the very same 
day, the website ‘Kavkaz-Centre’ published an order by Shamil 
Basayev, issued pursuant to the order of Aslan Maskhadov. These 
measures emphasized that ‘this step should be taken as a sign of 
goodwill’. On 25 February, a tripartite meeting was held in London 
between representatives of the Government of the Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria, the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia 
(SKSM), and representatives of the European Union. The participating 
parties adopted a memorandum entitled ‘The Road to Peace in Chech-
nya’– which ultimately failed to bring any results due to the fact that 
state officials in Moscow and Grozny would never permit someone 
such as Maskhadov or his representatives to participate in any peace 
process on behalf of the Chechen Republic. The sole exception would 
be for those who had surrendered their weapons in exchange for guar-
antees of security by the leadership of the Chechen Republic.  
 
Then on 8 March 2005, Aslan Maskhadov, the 54-year-old President 
of the non-existent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, was murdered in 
the village of Tolstoy-Yurt in the Grozny district. Animated commen-
tary ensued on the part of Russian and foreign media and politicians. 
The Russian print and electronic media differed, in that the latter took 
the opportunity to spread graphic images of Maskhadov’s half-naked 
corpse. The next day, the media reported that Abdul-Halim Sadulayev 
had become the Acting President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 
Prior to that, he had been the Chairman of the Supreme Sharia Court 
of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. His term of office was short, as 
he was killed in Argun on 17 June. 
 
Financing the process of recovery within the republic left much to be 
desired. The 23 December  2005 issue of the newspaper Vesti Respub-
liki commented on the situation:  
 
Although those in Moscow like to say that heavy investments have 
been made in Chechnya (unfortunately, our people also believe that a 
lot of money has been released for the restoration of the republic), the 
fact is that, in all, only about 15 billion rubles have been allocated for 
these purposes in the entire post-war period. That is a really low 
amount for a republic. For comparison, a sum of 45 billion rubles was 
allocated for the reconstruction of the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. For 
the reconstruction of the Mariinsky Theater in St. Petersburg, 35 bil-
lion rubles were allocated, and for holding celebrations for the millen-
nium anniversary of Kazan, the figure came to 68 billion rubles. 
 
At the same time as the process of peaceful restoration was underway, 
there were also continued clashes involving various militant bands, 
which sometimes entered villages (including Avtury, Alleroi, Roshni-
Chu, Dyshni-Vedeno), killing officials of the Ministry of the Interior 
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and the heads of local administrations. The Chechen Ministry of the 
Interior, in conjunction with Russia’s Joint Forces, reacted harshly to 
these attacks. According to the Commander of the Joint Forces in the 
North Caucasus, Colonel-General Yevgeniy Lazebin:  
 
In 2005, 290 militants were killed in Chechnya and about 270 of the 
militias’ bases and thousands more weapons caches were found. 
Among the militants who were wiped out were 72 band leaders. The 
trophies recovered by the Special Forces include 380 grenades, 41 
flame-throwers, 27 missile launchers, and 8 shoulder-fired air defense 
systems, in addition to thousands of guns, shells and mines. 346 im-
provised explosive devices and more than a tonne of explosives were 
also confiscated and disposed of.45 
 
Of course, generals dislike admitting that during operations involving 
the shelling of militants’ positions, everyday civilians often end up 
suffering. In August 2005, for instance, an artillery shell hit a private 
home in the village of Avtury owned by Chechnya’s Minister of 
Housing, Abu Sugaipov. In November, several shells landed in one of 
the neighbourhoods of the village of Starie Atagi, destroying the 
homes of the Yusupov and Khataev families. And in both Avtury and 
Starie Atagi, civilians were injured by these shelling attacks, including 
young children. There were serious public reactions following events 
that took place in early June in the village of Borozdinovskaya in the 
Shelkovsky district, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Avars. The 
village was subject to a devastating ‘sweep operation’, carried out by 
the ‘Vostok’ battalion detachment.46   
 
One of the most significant events in 2005 was the organization of the 
‘Train of Friendship’. It featured a delegation from the Chechen Re-
public composed of representatives of the republic in various spheres, 
among them political figures, artists, scientists, leaders of community 
and social organizations, as well as journalists. This Friendship Train, 
which aimed to promote positive information about the Chechen Re-
public and its people, travelled through 21 regions of the Russian Fed-
eration, from the Baltic Sea to the Far East.  
 
In August, Vladimir Putin signed a decree on elections to the Parlia-
ment of the Chechen Republic, according to the Constitution. The Par-
liament was to consist of two chambers – the People’s Assembly and 
the Council of the Republic. Elections were held in November 2005, 
with the victory claimed by the United Russia Party, as had been ex-
pected. In the new Parliament were also representatives of the regional 
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branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Un-
ion of Right Forces (Soyuz Pravykh Sil, SPS). Among the SPS mem-
bers was the former Minister of Defence from the Maskhadov gov-
ernment, Umar Khanbiev. Several other leading politicians from the 
days of the Maskhadov presidency also became MPs, and the general 
rules of the democratic game were actually adhered to. Thus, those 
parties who advocated an independent Chechnya also took part in 
these elections.  
 
The first session of Parliament of the Chechen Republic was held on 
12 December 2005. Among those in attendance was Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, who remarked that the juridical process involved in 
restoring constitutional order in the republic had finally been com-
pleted. 
Conclusion 
During the so-called ‘anti-terrorist operations’ carried out in Chech-
nya, the Kremlin resorted to indiscriminate large-scale military opera-
tions involving aircraft and artillery, as well as special ‘mop-up opera-
tions’. Widespread and unprovoked violence was widely applied, 
causing the death and disappearance of thousands of people, and ulti-
mately resulting in a ‘political settlement’. State authorities of the 
Chechen Republic were finally formed through the use of a range of 
political methods – with the government first being controlled by 
Akhmad Kadyrov, and then by Ramzan Kadyrov following the death 
of his father, although Alu Alkhanov also served as president for 
nearly two and a half years. Power and offers of amnesty for former 
militants eventually led them to switch over to the side of Akhmad 
Kadyrov, and subsequently to support Ramzan Kadyrov. It was these 
groups that acted as the mainstay of the policy of ‘Chechenization’, 
which was characterized by relative selectivity in the conduct of ‘anti-
terrorist operations’, while gross violations of human rights continued. 
It was during this period, with the reduction of military confrontation 
in the Chechen Republic, that the armed conflict began to ‘sprawl’ 
beyond the borders of Chechnya and into other republics in the North 
Caucasus. 
 
This period saw a shift in Kremlin policies with respect to the Che-
chen Republic – a transition from a situation summed up in Putin’s 
earlier ‘we will wipe out the terrorists even in the outhouse’, to his 
opening statement to the Chechen Parliament: ‘to be free, independ-
ent, and thrive is possible only together with a free and prosperous 
Russia.’47
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Economic Recovery in Chechnya:  
History and Modernity 
Tamara U. Elbuzdukayeva 
 
 
 
 
Today’s Chechen Republic is facing problems in economic and social 
development. In the 1990s, Chechnya was deeply submerged in armed 
conflict that set development back by decades. The republic has un-
dergone a virtual humanitarian disaster. Rectifying this situation is 
largely dependent on the policies of the federal authorities and the ca-
pacity to deal with multiple challenges within a short timeframe. 
Chechnya needs to rise above the ruins of destruction, resolve social 
problems, and integrate the republic with the wider economic and le-
gal framework of the Russian Federation. 
 
In this contribution, the author traces the dynamics of the economic 
reconstruction of Chechnya by placing the current situation in the his-
torical context of the Soviet as well as the post-Soviet periods. 
Economic development after the Russian Civil War (1918--
1920)  
The Civil War of the early 20th century left behind a trail of ruin in 
Chechnya. What had been relatively new industries were burnt to 
ashes, heavily strewn with rubble and charred rubbish. With respect to 
older industries, only a few buildings and drilling rigs survived. Most 
of the oil refineries in Zavodsky district were destroyed, while those 
that were left remained inactive. During the war, oil production 
plummeted – a more than six-fold drop compared with 1917. Of the 
nine oil wells that were set on fire in Novogroznensky district, five 
continued to burn for one and a half years. It is estimated that 90% of 
the industrial infrastructure in the district was completely destroyed. 
In the city of Grozny itself, oil refineries and mechanical plants were 
in very poor condition, and the railway terminal lay in ruins. Total los-
ses for Grozny’s oil industry as a result of the Civil War amounted to 
126 million rubles. 
 
A dire situation developed in relation to the work force. Many oil 
workers had been killed; others moved to more rural settlements. En-
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gineers and technicians also abandoned their jobs. Foreign specialists 
fled the region. There was an acute shortage of housing, clothing and 
food. Workers and their families were practically left starving.  
 
As soon as Grozny was freed of the White Russia troops of Lieutenant  
General Denikin, the government took measures to restore the oil in-
dustry quickly, and to organize the export of petroleum products. In 
April 1920, a state institution, the Central Petroleum Directorate 
(TSNU), was established to oversee the oil fields and factories, with 
I.V. Kosior as its head. Two regiments of the Caucasus Labour Army 
were sent to Grozny to aid local workers in carrying out the necessary 
reconstruction. Established in April 1920, the Labour Army was put to 
work rebuilding dormitories, repairing roads and clearing the wreck-
age from industrial sites.  From May to August 1920, the number of 
operating oil wells rose from 72 to 101, while oil production increased 
more than five-fold.1 
 
Oil refineries began to operate better, as the pumps were repaired, 
along with the tanks and distilling apparatus. The government allo-
cated and delineated the oil district of Grozny, recognizing its eco-
nomic and political importance for both the region and the country as 
a whole. 
 
The Labour and Defence Council (LDC) implemented a series of ur-
gent measures to assist the oil industry. On 15 July 1921, the oil in-
dustry and its composite enterprises were allocated their own special 
protective security force. A special commission on oil issues, Glav-
komneft, was established, and within it a special fund was set up to 
assist in managing oil-related affairs. 
 
In 1921 and 1922 oil workers continued under difficult circumstances. 
In 1921 the food shortage was exacerbated as a result of famine in the 
Volga region. Rations allocated to the Caucasian Labour Army were 
not issued on a regular basis and there were delays in the payment of 
workers’ wages. From June onwards, the families of executives and 
administrators were removed from the list of those receiving subsis-
tence allowances, while the allowance permitted for the families of 
workers was reduced to one-third of the previous level. A significant 
decline in labour discipline and employee morale ensued. Workers 
tended to either engage in handicrafts or return to village life. Anti-
Soviet sentiment was on the rise, and acts of arson and theft became 
more frequent in the oilfields. 
 
                                                 
1  Essays on the history of Chechen-Ingushetia. Vol. 2. Grozny: 1972, p. 97. 
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At the outset of 1922, the Labour and Defence Council authorized 
Grozneft to sell two million poods (the equivalent of 32,760 tonnes) of 
petroleum abroad and to use the proceeds to purchase essential mate-
rials and equipment. In mid-1923, several shipments from England, 
Germany and the Netherlands were delivered to Grozny. Among the 
items were 30 oil motors, 35 steam engines, five machining tools, 
three iron drilling rigs, pipes, belts, hoses, steel cables, as well as 10 
thousand workers’ uniforms and 30 thousand pairs of shoes. In addi-
tion, Grozny received equipment and materials from other cities in 
Russia.  
 
These efforts led to the growth of Grozny’s oil industry. New drilling 
rigs were built, and shell pumps and bailers were replaced with deep 
pumps and rotary percussion drills.   
 
In 1921/1922, total oil production amounted to 1.436 million tonnes, 
and the number of wells in use rose to 208. The economic situation of 
Grozneft improved, with net profits of more than 3.7 billion ru-
bles2The recovery of the oil industry was accompanied by technical 
improvements. By the autumn of 1925, 349 Grozneft oil production 
units had been hooked up to an electrical power supply, and 66% of 
all operating wells had been converted to deep-pumping production. 
 
The oilfields became more profitable. In 1922/23, the labour produc-
tivity in the oil production sector doubled as compared to 1918 levels, 
effectively reducing production costs. The industry underwent stable 
development and innovative measures were introduced. The export of 
petroleum products abroad in 1924/1925 was more than 17 times the 
level recorded in 1913.3 
 
By the end of 1925 the oil industry had experienced a full recovery, 
accompanied by technological modernization. This included the uni-
versal implementation of the electrification and mechanization of en-
terprises, the introduction of rotary drilling, and deep-pump crude oil 
production. Crude oil refining activity was developing successfully 
and new kinds of petroleum products were introduced to the market. 
Grozneft’s net profits in 1925 reached 19.5 million rubles4.  
 
Along with the restoration and development of the oil industry in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia, headway was also made in establishing lo-
cal industries. These included the processing of agricultural products, 
                                                 
2  A.V. Bolbukh. The history of the workers of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet So-
cialist Republic. Grozny: 1986, p. 19. 
3  Government Archives of the Chechen-Ingush Oblast, fund 242, register 1, file 74, sheet 
35. 
4  Central State Archive of the Chechen Republic, fund 16, register 2, file 745, sheet 329. 
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the expansion of construction activity, the development of hydro-
power from the region’s mountain rivers, and the utilization of other 
natural resources. 
 
In March 1923, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee re-
solved to transfer to Chechnya the control of local flour mills, dairies 
and creameries, as well as factories and plants for the production of 
alcohol, mechanical equipment and products, leather, bricks and tiles. 
In 1924, the Autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic, which included 
Ingushetia, devolved control of ten production-based industrial enter-
prises to Ingushetia. These included flour mills, wine distilleries, tan-
neries, plants for producing starch and soap, and lumber mills. By the 
end of 1926, there were 28 such industrial enterprises operating in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia.  
 
The restoration of the region’s industrial base led to the revival of the 
working class. A central feature of the industrialization of the national 
areas of the North Caucasus was that it was carried out under condi-
tions involving only minor representation of blue-collar workers in the 
social structure of the local population. The objectives of industrializa-
tion and the training of skilled workers were tasks that were addressed 
simultaneously. 
 
The Communists who were in power were convinced that the region’s 
potential was being held back by underdevelopment, and that the solu-
tion lay in developing large-scale modern industry. The wide scope of 
industrialization required new workers, and it was determined that 
these new workers should be increasingly be drawn from local ethnic 
groups.  
 
Attempts to engage the mountain dwellers in industry and in the con-
struction, transport and other sectors of the economy began with the 
re-organization of the Autonomous Mountain Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic. However, difficulties were encountered in this process of building 
up a workforce from amongst the local residents, due mainly to their 
specific national characteristics and socio-economic conditions, not to 
mention the cultural, domestic and religious factors of their develop-
ment The main source for recruitment of the new workforce were 
farmers, craftsman and artisans, the children of other blue-collar 
workers and other personnel working in the various industrial areas of 
the country, including women. A characteristic feature of this process 
was the massive rejuvenation of the working class. Another character-
istic of the working class here was that it remained multinational in 
composition. It expanded, first and foremost, due to the recruitment of 
the local population and involvement of ethnic Russian workers from 
other parts of the country. Prior to the fulfilment of the first five-year 
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plan, there were very few representatives of the Chechen and Ingush 
ethnic groups among the workers of Grozny’s industrial sector; those 
that were enlisted were working as unskilled labourers (manual dig-
gers, messengers, watchmen, etc.)  
 
The government contradistinguished Grozny as a proletarian centre, 
referring to it as a large village where natural forms of farming were 
preserved and where the Chechen population was characterized by 
low cultural levels (literacy in the native language was no higher than 
10 per cent) and a significant presence of patriarchal, tribal and reli-
gious relations. In this regard, the objectives established by the gov-
ernment included as much involvement of Chechens in industry as 
possible, to provide them with useful skills, and to promote their adap-
tation to the new conditions of life in the country.5 The main reason 
for involving the Chechens in the oil production industry in Grozny 
was to enable them to realize their proletarian influence on the re-
maining masses of the Chechen peasantry. 
 
In this context, the question of the social selection of the workforce 
moved to the forefront. By creating national contingents of the work-
ing class, the command-administrative system pursued the objective 
of expanding the social base of the new regime. It was only by relying 
on the poor, classless parts of the population, and the recruitment of 
Soviet bureaucracy from amongst them, that this system was able to 
function effectively.  
 
On 25 August 1931, the Presidium of the Council on Nationalities of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the decree ‘On the devel-
opment of industry in national republics and regions, the growth of the 
local proletariat, and the technical skills of the indigenous nationalities 
and supporting their socio-cultural needs’. This document indicated 
that the national republics and regions had not taken sufficient meas-
ures to prepare industrial workers from amongst the indigenous popu-
lation – in particular, regarding the involvement of representatives of 
the indigenous population as workers in the industrial sector. It further 
stated that local authorities had failed to establish accountability in 
this area. With respect to the enterprises operating in the national re-
publics and regions, the administrations themselves had often failed to 
provide proper living and working conditions for workers from the 
indigenous population. Having such arrangements would have been 
conducive to the consolidation of industry in those regions. 
 
Women were identified as yet another important source for reinforc-
ing the working class during the first Soviet five-year plan. In addition 
                                                 
5  Government Archives of the Chechen-Ingush Oblast, fund 241, register 1, file 78, sheets 
11–13. 
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to the economic significance of this move, special political importance 
was attached to the involvement of women in industrial production, 
especially women from the mountainous regions. This was seen as 
imperative for changing the entire lifestyles of the mountain peoples. 
A significant step was the resolution of the Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) of 1925 ‘The Im-
mediate tasks of the Party in its work among working women, peas-
ants and toilers of the East’. In this document, the Party paid particular 
attention to the need for maximizing the involvement of women in 
building cooperatives, in trade unions and in economic development 
in general.  
 
The March 1925 meeting of the National Commission of the North 
Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party 
outlined three main tasks to this end: 1) engaging the mountain dwell-
ers in cooperatives; 2) the development of local women's handicrafts 
(including basketry, wool spinning, weaving and other crafts) and 
their organization into cooperatives; and 3) involving  the mountain 
dwellers in production activities at factories and plants.6  
 
Major work in encouraging the involvement of women mountain 
dwellers in production activities was carried out by the Commissions 
on Improving Working and Living Conditions that were organized 
under Soviet Committees at the provincial and district levels. Among 
the tasks assigned to the Commissions was the responsibility for 
studying the working and living conditions of women mountain 
dwellers, to attract them to social labour, and to organize non-
agricultural producers’ cooperative associations. In Chechnya, work-
shops were organized for felt production, knitting of hosiery and wool 
spinning.7 
 
Such women's cooperative associations were not always profitable, 
due to the inadequacy of the material and technical infrastructure and 
their members’ lack of experience and ability to work in social pro-
duction. These associations were expedient, however, in terms of 
achieving the policy for involving mountain women in social labour. 
As for the oil industry, given its specific nature (the majority of field 
operations involve extremely hard physical labour), women were re-
luctant to engage in such work.  
 
The production process became difficult to manage due to the influx 
at factories, fisheries and construction sites of thousands of people 
(among them peasants, youth, and women) who did not have the 
                                                 
6  Central State Archives of the Chechen Republic, fund P–268, register 1, file 132, sheet 6. 
7  Government Archives of the Chechen-Ingush Oblast, fund 1, register 1, file 262, sheet 76. 
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slightest idea about industry, its organization or required work pace. 
Misconduct, tardiness, truancy, and absence from the workplace were 
all factors that caused the emergence of troubling decisions on the part 
of the heads of the Party’s organs. Inexperienced and hastily trained 
workers were rendering expensive equipment unusable. Soviet histo-
riography has consistently denied the involvement of any kind of peo-
ple’s movement in these occurrences. Be that as it may, resistance to a 
new factory or plant atmosphere at times drove the new workers to the 
deliberate breaking of machinery. This is confirmed by the aggres-
siveness in these acts that eventually led to claims of subversive activ-
ity or sabotage. 
 
The situation was compounded by other phenomena – notably labour 
mobility and turnover – which grew on a frightening scale during the 
first five-year plan.  
 
Rapid industrialization demanded more and more skilled labour, while 
the time allowed for the training of such specialists grew slimmer and 
the technology involved grew more complicated. This contradiction 
gave rise to and subsequently reinforced the phenomenon of unprofes-
sionalism in the workplace. Production facilities were subject to an 
influx of people with only the most basic awareness of any profes-
sional skill or expertise. 
 
To sum up, in the 1920s and 1930s, the economy of Chechnya under-
went significant changes, and the economic potential of the republic 
increased significantly. Dozens of new businesses were launched 
every year, new industries were established, and major developments 
could be seen in energy and transportation. The economic and strate-
gic importance of the Grozny oil district was huge, and the govern-
ment fully supported the reconstruction and further development of 
industry sectors. Oil refining also underwent remarkable advances. 
Grozny oil became a crucial factor in the industrialization of the coun-
try, an important export commodity for the Soviet Union. The associ-
ated material and human costs remained disproportionately high, and 
the results achieved did not always match initial projections. Never-
theless, the main outcome was undeniable – a major industry had 
emerged in Checheno-Ingushetia. 
Consequences of the Second World War (1941-1945) on the 
economy 
The Second World War – or the Great Patriotic War, as it is known in 
the Soviet Union – radically changed the living and working condi-
tions of the multi-ethnic population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.  
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Issues surrounding the military and the mobilization of troops moved 
to the forefront. The republic faced the task of having to increase its 
oil production sharply. The new tasks included the provision of a 
broad exploration drilling and transmission programme for the un-
tapped areas in the Oysungur, Adu-Yurt, Sernovodsk, Alhazovo, Al-
hanchurt regions. The demanding challenge of increasing agricultural 
production fell to the region’s farmers.8  
 
Industrial enterprises were ultimately converted to military purposes. 
The Krasny Molot plant, the mechanical shops of Grozneft, and the 
Krasny Trud plant were re-tooled for arms production. By early Sep-
tember 1941, 28 enterprises had been converted to producing weap-
onry, military equipment, and ammunition.9 This was made possible 
due to the command-based economic system that prevailed in the So-
viet economy in the 1920s and 1930s.  
 
By October 1941, the front was drawing nearer to the boundary of the 
North Caucasus. In response, on 28 October 1941, the State Defence 
Committee of the USSR decided to dismantle the factories, the oil in-
dustry field sites and machine engineering enterprises of the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR and evacuate them further into the interior of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Between 3 November and 11 December 1941, the drilling equipment 
from state oil companies was completely dismantled and partially 
transported to Baku. In addition, 678 marginal production wells of 
Grozneftekombinat were stripped. The  Krasny Molot plant was dis-
mantled, including its repair, mechanical plant and workshops.  
The dismantling of production wells resulted in a sharp drop in oil 
production, with total production of Grozneftekombinat falling to 
6500 tonnes per day. Drilling operations were completely discontin-
ued as well.10 
 
On 29 November 1941, Soviet troops liberated Rostov-on-Don from 
the occupying Nazi troops. This effectively eliminated the threat of an 
enemy breakthrough into the North Caucasus. By early January 1942, 
the oil workers of the republic had carried out a great deal of work in 
rebuilding the top-priority factories and plants. They also succeeded in 
restoring 190 production wells. During the first half of 1942, all of the 
enterprises that had seen their equipment dismantled had been re-
stored, and these oil enterprises could resume operations in May/June. 
                                                 
8  State Archives of the Russian Federation, fund 17, register 22, file 3670, sheets 17–18. 
9  State Archives of the Chechen Republic, fund16, register 13, file 125, sheet 152. 
10  History of Chechnya from ancient times to the present day. Vol. 2. Grozny: 2008, p. 480. 
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This work brought oil production up to 6984 tonnes per day in January 
of 1943.11 
 
The Krasniy Molot Machine-Building Plant was fully restored by the 
end of January 1942 and once again began to manufacture war materi-
als for the front. 
 
During the course of restructuring the economy to a war footing, the 
republic's leadership and management bodies encountered great diffi-
culties. Army recruitment of workers from heavy industry, the trans-
port and agriculture sectors caused a significant shortage of manpower 
as well as of expertise. The transformation of industrial enterprises to 
defence-oriented production required large numbers of workers with 
new skills, including engineers and technicians. However, these chal-
lenges were resolved. Women played an important role in replenishing 
the labour force in both industry and transportation during the war 
years. In the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, as well as throughout the coun-
try, a movement began to promote the mobilization and involvement 
of women in industrial and transportation enterprises. In 1942, the 
Krasny Molot Plant was employing 385 women, making up 22% of all 
employees.12 By 1 January 1944, the number of women working in 
the oil industry had reached 6691, accounting for 44.2% of the oil 
workforce. 
 
Railroad transport played a vital role in restructuring the national 
economy to the conditions of war. From the beginning of the war, the 
republic’s railways operated according to a military timetable. 
 
In accordance with the general plan for the summer offensive of 1942, 
the German Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) had developed a plan 
to capture the Caucasus, code-named ‘Edelweiss’.13 In planning the 
offensive in the Caucasus, the Nazi command established a specific 
target for its troops – by 17 September they were to capture Grozny, 
and by September 25, they were to overtake Baku and push the ad-
vance further into the Caucasus. 
 
On July 30, 1942, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief established the Transcaucasian Front. It was charged 
with presenting a defensive line along the Terek River, the Urukh 
River and the mountain passes of the Main Caucasian range, as well 
as creating multiple lines of defence along the Grozny–Makhachkala–
Baku route.  
                                                 
11  State Archives of the Chechen Republic, fund 1, register 32, file 164, sheet 19. 
12  V.V. Nikitin. Goryuchee-Frontu (To the Fuel Front). Moscow: 1984, p. 45. 
13  V.V. Nikitin. Goryuchee-Frontu (To the Fuel Front). Moscow: 1984, p. 45. 
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Taking advantage of its superiority in manpower and military equip-
ment, the Nazi forces broke through several of the Soviet troops’ lines 
of defence. By early September 1942, they were already close to the 
borders of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The invading forces captured 
Mozdok and the villages of Ischerskaya, Naurskaya and Nichol-
aevskaya, located on the road to Grozny. 
 
On 7 August 1942, martial law was imposed throughout the territory 
of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. A contingency plan was established in 
accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
‘On martial law’, dated 22 June 1941.14 
 
In the summer of 1942, the republic was once again subject to the 
dismantling and evacuation of its industrial enterprises, as well as the 
evacuation of its population. While industrial operations were discon-
tinued, Grozny nevertheless continued to supply the front with fuel 
and food. In accordance with the Resolution of the State Defence 
Committee of 22 September 1942, the workers, civil servants and 
technical personnel of the republic’s oil industry were mobilized to a 
wartime footing for the duration of the war. Equipment from the 
Grozneftkombinat plant, the power plants and networks of Ordzhen-
ergo, and enterprises from the republic’s other industrial branches 
were loaded into railway cars for shipment deeper into the interior of 
the Soviet Union. The Malgobekneft and Gorskneft state enterprises in 
the active oil districts were completely put out of commission. In all, 
2328 wells were abandoned.15 In order to meet the needs of the front, 
several oil wells remained operative, in addition to small reserves of 
crude oil, benzene; lube oil and light oils such as kerosene. 
 
Industrial enterprises were fully transferred to the maintenance of 
military units. The enterprises that remained in the republic continued 
to operate smoothly. As 1942 drew to a close, machine engineering 
plants, mechanical factories and the workshops of Grozneftekombinat 
were manufacturing military production worth 35.5 million rubles16.  
 
Then, by the end of 1942, the military situation had changed in favour 
of the Soviet forces defending the Caucasus. The threat of enemy 
troops penetrating Grozny as gone. 
 
In late November that year, the partial restoration of wells got under-
way, and programmes for extracting and refining oil began. By 26 
                                                 
14  State Archives of the Chechen Republic, fund 1, register 1, file 1197, sheet 18; file 924, 
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November, the most profitable oil wells had been restored, to be fol-
lowed by all other oil wells.  
 
After the defeat of Nazi forces in the North Caucasus, work began in 
the republic on the reconstruction of industrial enterprises in Grozny, 
which had suffered losses due to bombing and shelling, as well as in 
connection with the evacuation and re-evacuation of local plants and 
equipment. For the period between August 1941 to 1943, the damage 
to the republic’s oil industry, in monetary terms, amounted to more 
than half a billion rubles. Losses experienced by the Malgobekneft 
enterprise were estimated at 231 million, Stargrozneft at over 112 mil-
lion, Oktyabrneft at 106 million, Gorskneft at 80 million and 
Grozneftzavod at 22 million rubles.17 As for the energy, local, food 
and related industries, agriculture, communications, science, culture, 
education and health sectors, damages were estimated in the millions 
of rubles.  
 
From March/April 1943, restoration work got underway in the repub-
lic. For the development of the oil industry in Grozny in 1944, the 
government allocated 69.2 million rubles. Grozny’s oil industry con-
tinued to evolve, continuously providing fuel to the front, as well as 
industrial and light oils.  
 
In the post-war period, the economy of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR 
proceeded within the framework of the planned Soviet economy. 
Much of this involved the presence of qualified personnel among the 
working class and professionals, mainly representatives of the Rus-
sian-speaking population. 
Restoring Chechnya’s economy and social sphere following 
the end of hostilities in 1999  
The material losses incurred by the military operations carried out dur-
ing the Russian–Chechen war are simply incalculable. Of the existing 
428 Chechen villages, 380 were exposed to bombardment, 70% of the 
housing was destroyed, and Grozny was virtually razed to the ground. 
All of the republic’s industry and agriculture was wiped out. In the 
second Chechen war, oil production infrastructure was not spared, and 
air and railway links were disrupted. The republic and its people were 
literally robbed. More than 90% of the working population was left 
with no regular employment. The republic’s most educated, produc-
tive, and skilled citizens – precisely that sector of the population that 
represents the potential and hope for the future – have left Chechnya. 
During a decade plagued with troubles, an entire generation of young 
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people (150–200,000 people) has grown up in Chechnya without pro-
per access to education. Many of them became involved in the armed 
conflict and do not know how to do anything other than fight. 
 
The cultural losses were immense in Chechnya. Many institutions 
were subject to looting and destruction – among them the Academy of 
Sciences, the University, the Petroleum and Pedagogical Institutes, 
two dozen industry-related scientific and research institutes, just as 
many colleges, and the majority of schools, hospitals, libraries. Major 
damage was done to local museums, theatres, archives, private librar-
ies and other property of cultural value. 
 
Since the end of 1999, there have come repeated claims about the 
work being carried out and progress being made in rebuilding the 
economy and the social sphere of Chechnya. In practice, however, the 
actual results have been quite modest.  
 
In 2000 budget of the Russian Federation had no expenditure lines 
fully dedicated to Chechnya, other than for child allowances (516 mil-
lion rubles), the establishment of a fund to support the delivery of pe-
troleum products and food products (58 million rubles), and compen-
sation for lost housing and property (a total of 428 million rubles). 
The financing that was directed towards Chechnya in 2000 was based 
on the re-allocation of funds from some regular line items of the fed-
eral budget, as well as extra-budgetary funds. Although the mayor of 
Grozny, Ivan S. Makhchaev, reported that 70% of Grozny had been 
devastated, not a penny has been allocated for its restoration. Nikolai 
Koshman said virtually the same thing, adding that the impressive 
amounts that Prime Minister Michail Kasyanov (2.5 billion rubles per 
month) claimed were being allocated to Chechnya, actually included 
the amount for maintaining the Russian army and the Ministry of Inte-
rior Affairs. The funds allocated directly to the republic were only for 
the salaries of civil servants and the renovation of local schools, hospi-
tals and cultural institutions.  
 
On 1 December 1999, Resolution no. 1320 of the Russian Federation, 
‘On measures to normalize the social and political situation in the 
Chechen Republic’ was issued in order to provide for the necessities 
of life in the ‘liberated’ regions of the Chechen Republic and emer-
gency social assistance to people living there.18  
 
On 8 June  2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Decree 
and the Regulation ‘On the organization of a temporary system of ex-
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ecutive authorities in the Chechen Republic’. On that same day, a bill 
by the same name was introduced in the State Duma. And on 12 June, 
the President signed a decree appointing Akhmad Kadyrov as the 
Head of Administration of the Chechen Republic – a move initially 
met with mixed feelings. 
 
The situation in the Chechen Republic itself was far from stable. 
Armed fighting continued. Air and artillery strikes were conducted on 
various parts of the republic. ‘Cleansing’ operations were still carried 
out, with entire settlements being sealed off. To enter Grozny, one had 
to pass through dozens of roadblocks, having already waited many 
hours in queue. The arbitrary killing of religious leaders, heads of ad-
ministrations, law enforcement officials, and Russian-speaking citi-
zens also began. 
 
The militants and suicide bombers staged attacks. This situation be-
came further complicated by the fact that various political, law en-
forcement and security structures of the Russian Federation attempted 
to pursue policies in Chechnya that would further their own narrow 
interests, drawing on various political forces and personalities from 
amongst the Chechens. In the second half of 2000 came a wave of 
bloody purges, especially in the lowlands, during which thousands of 
people were detained. Ordinary residents of the republic suffered from 
despotism at the hands of both the Russian soldiers and the militants. 
Not a day passed in the autumn and winter of 2000 without reports of 
clashes, ‘cleansing sweeps’, artillery and air strikes, and raids in the 
central market, which spilled over into organized robberies. 
 
In 2000, the main challenges facing the Governmental Commission 
for the restoration of the Chechen Republic, headed by Deputy Prime 
Minister Viktor Khristenko, were to create a mechanism for financing 
the reconstruction of the republic, and a system to manage this process 
and the functioning of its executive branch. 
 
The financing of activities under the Russian Federation Government 
Federal special-purpose programme for rebuilding Chechnya in 2002 
came from three main sources: 1) the federal budget (about 7.95 bil-
lion rubles); 2) extra-budgetary funds (about 1.8 billion rubles), in-
cluding funds from the Russian Federation Pension Fund and funds 
derived from export sales of oil produced in Chechnya; and 3) the 
funds of the commercial entities RAO Unified Energy System of Rus-
sia, OJSC Gazprom and the Russian Ministry of Railways (about 2.79 
billion rubles).19 The revenue side of the budget amounted to 5.58 bil-
lion rubles, and Chechnya’s own budget revenues were projected to 
                                                 
19  ‘The foundation of Chechnya’s restoration has been laid. Interview with Vladimir  
Yelagin’, Russia's Economy: XXI century. no. 2 (7), May 2002. 
Julie Wilhelmsen and Erika Fatland, eds 54 
780 million rubles. The bulk of the budget was covered by transfers 
from the federal budget. There were also plans for covering the deficit 
of the Chechen Republic and increasing its revenues by privatizing 
various state-owned enterprises and other property on the territory of 
Chechnya.  
 
The Russian government has implemented the programme for the res-
toration of the economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic, 
which was approved on 25 January 2001. In 2001, the sum of 14.4 
billion rubles was allocated for these purposes. Federal authorities and 
the Department of the State Employment Service for the Chechen Re-
public, together with local authorities, organized 69 thousand tempo-
rary jobs for 45 thousand people, mainly in the clearing of roads and 
debris and in the construction of housing. The construction of two 
combined heating/ power plants was carried out, in addition to brick-
works, processing mills for agricultural products, and bakeries in rural 
areas. In Grozny, work began on restoring the oil refinery, with oil 
production carried out according to a temporary regime of up to 700 
tonnes per day. Transport infrastructure was also rebuilt. From April 
2001, there was a weekly passenger train service between Gudermes 
and Moscow.  
 
The fuel and energy infrastructure of the republic was also restored. A 
total of 1232 km of high-voltage power lines were put back into com-
mission, out of the 2436 km previously in operation. Seventy of the 
108 existing transformer substations were re-commissioned; electric-
ity was again provided to 212 settlements; and the supply of natural 
gas was restored to 105 villages and numerous districts. Long-distance 
telephone communications were re-instated, and a mobile telephone 
network was set up, initially with very limited access. Since its de-
ployment, telecommunications in the Chechen Republic have re-
mained among the most expensive in the world.  
 
In the 2000/2001 academic year, 357 schools were in operation in 
Chechnya, as well as three institutions of higher education, and 12 
polytechnical and vocational-technical colleges. Through the Russian 
Ministry of Education, 500 seats for preferential admission to Russian 
universities were reserved for graduates of schools in Chechnya in 
2001/2002, including 70 seats in educational institutions located in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. By June 2001, the Administration of the 
Chechen Republic had fully repaid the overdue salaries of public sec-
tor employees for the year 2000. Over 50 thousand children from 
Chechnya left the republic for medical treatment and health retreat 
stays in other regions of Russia.20  
                                                 
20  History of Chechnya from ancient times to the present day. Grozny: 2008, p. 796. 
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The mechanical engineering industry in the republic, mainly repre-
sented by the production of machinery and equipment for the oil in-
dustry, was completely destroyed during the war. There is no possibil-
ity of its ever being restored to its original form, because the niche 
previously enjoyed by the machinery building sector in Chechnya has 
now been claimed by other companies operating in this sphere. 
 
After carrying out an in-depth study, the Ministry of Industry Science 
of the Russian Federation was tasked with determining the prospects 
of redeveloping the machine engineering sector in the Chechen Re-
public. In 2001, work was carried out to restore the workshops of 
various local factories, including those of Orgtechnika, Avtomash-
stroy, Transmash and Pischemash. As regards larger industrial project, 
studies are currently being carried out to evaluate their prospects of 
entering the market, as well as the possibility of staffing such plants 
and factories with qualified personnel. The latter point is an important 
consideration, since much of the qualified population has left Chech-
nya altogether. 
 
Since the restoration of the republic's economy is taking place against 
the background of new socio-political realities, it is necessary to cal-
culate the profitability of integrating local industrial facilities into the 
market. The internal market of the Chechen Republic is quite compre-
hensive. True, most products are imported, but domestic production – 
particularly in the processing of agricultural produce, food production, 
as well as the consumer goods market, in large part – is effectively 
stimulating domestic demand within the republic. Examples of this 
impetus include the sugar factory in Argun, the wine industry in Naur-
sky district, and construction companies throughout the republic.  
 
Despite the complete absence of any stable inflow of investment, 
small business is actively developing in post-war Chechnya. Even in 
Grozny, which was totally destroyed during the war, the first few sto-
reys of buildings often remained; here shops and service-based firms 
have been opened, which speaks to the high energy and industrious-
ness of the Chechen people. 
 
The issue of employment is particularly critical in the republic. In 
2002, several industrial enterprises were put into commission, among 
which were a factory producing knitted fabrics, a dairy, a packaging 
factory, a footwear plant, a cement plant with output capacity of 300 
thousand tonnes per year, and four quarries for the production of con-
crete aggregate. The most dynamic sectors in the republic are now the 
agro-industrial complex and the construction industry. In total in 
2002, there were 150 thousand regularly paid jobs in the republic.  
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The petroleum and oil refinery complex of the Chechen Republic are 
its greatest assets, and there is currently a struggle over their control. 
There has emerged a gross discrepancy between the interests of the 
Russian Government, the republic's leadership and the interests of the 
oil companies themselves. The contradictions inherent in the systemic 
interests of each of these groups are a key determining factor in the 
situation in the republic today. 
 
The main oil-producing enterprise of the republic has long been the 
Grozneft conglomerate, which is part of an integrated production sys-
tem involved in the extraction, processing and transport of oil and pe-
troleum products. In November 2000, JSC Grozneftegaz – a subsidi-
ary of the oil company Rosneft – was established to manage the oil 
and gas industry of the republic. In late 2000 and early 2001, this en-
terprise recorded an output of 300 thousand tonnes of crude oil per 
day. At that time, there were more than 30 out-of-control wells that 
were openly gushing, huge amounts of oil were being burned, and up 
to two thousand tonnes of oil per day were being pilfered. The com-
pany Grozneftegaz provided jobs to more than three thousand people. 
Crude oil production in 2003 amounted to 1.8 million tonnes, and in-
vestment in the company reached 3.6 billion rubles. At the same time, 
2.3 billion rubles in tax payments were transferred to the federal and 
local budgets. In 2004, 11 new producing wells were put into commis-
sion. 
 
Grozneftegazinvolved itself in the restoration of the social sphere and 
its related establishments in Chechnya. In 2003 alone, the company 
spent 125.5 million rubles for this purpose, extending charitable aid to 
various organizations in the republic. Nevertheless, residents of the 
republic tend to perceive the activities of Rosneft as being specifically 
targeted at the export of raw materials produced in Chechnya, with no 
efforts whatsoever to rebuild its oil industry. 
 
The traditional industrial mainstay of the Chechen Republic, oil refin-
ing, was completely destroyed during the war. However, the function-
ing of underground mini-refineries, which operated even during mili-
tary operations, resolved the problem of petrol and diesel fuel supplies 
– and not only to consumers in the Chechen Republic, as such mini-
plants enabled petroleum products to be supplied to neighbouring re-
gions. On the other hand, such production has severely polluted the 
environment, and has led to widespread disease and poisoning among 
the population, in addition to other serious consequences.  
 
Over the past ten years, the system for the distribution of the proceeds 
from the sale of Grozny oil has constantly changed. When Chechnya’s 
leadership was made up of persons loyal to Moscow, a portion of the 
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funds were handed over to Chechnya, apparently as a sign of confi-
dence and encouragement. However, in instances characterized by 
conflict, all of the revenues were instead formally transferred to the 
federal level. In 2002, a 100% stake in Grozneftegaz was owned by 
the state-owned company Rosneft; only two years later, that was re-
duced to 51%, with the remainder transferred to the Ministry of State 
Property of Chechnya. 
 
Funding directly transferred from the federal budget to Chechnya in 
2000 amounted to 967.6 million rubles. In 2001, that figure was 3.1 
billion rubles; in 2002, 6.2 billion. In 2003, 8.0 billion were trans-
ferred and, for the first seven months of 2004, transfers amounted to 
8.3 billion rubles. Unfortunately, with no control mechanism in place 
for the use of budgetary funds on the part of the Chechen Republic, 
this has resulted in vast sums being embezzled.21 
 
In general, the socio-economic situation in Chechnya has remained 
difficult. According to German Gref, in charge of overseeing the proc-
ess of revitalizing the Chechen economy on the federal side, ‘there is 
huge dissatisfaction regarding the facilities that are being financed by 
the authorities of the Chechen Republic itself, as well as by the Fed-
eral government’. The facilities targeted for restoration and for which 
funds have been allocated by the authorities include facilities that have 
either been laid up or for which the construction has still not been 
completed (despite statements indicating that the funding process for 
these objects is in full swing). It often happens that when money is 
received for the construction of particular facilities, those funds are 
then written off, because the projects themselves were long ago de-
molished. 
 
Local residents have virtually been left without any proper livelihood. 
Instead, they have turned to illegal business – transactions involving 
stolen oil, drug smuggling, construction scams, etc. Local youth, who 
have experienced a lifetime of nothing but war, cannot avail them-
selves the option to migrate to other parts of Russia to take employ-
ment there, since the economic crisis has led to massive unemploy-
ment throughout the federation. 
 
In May 2004, the federal government announced that the current fed-
eral special-purpose programme for restoring the socio-economic 
sphere of the Chechen Republic would be subject to further review. 
According to German Gref, the number of projects funded from the 
federal budget should be reduced and the funds transferred should 
concentrate on start-up facilities, particularly infrastructure projects. 
                                                 
21  Official website of the Government of the Russian Federation. 
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The Head of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation supported the idea of attracting private enterprises to do 
business in the Chechen Republic by offering special customs and tax 
benefits to companies engaged in the processing of agricultural pro-
duce and the construction sector. It was proposed that funding for the 
restoration of social infrastructure be increased and that key industries 
be further developed, including the agricultural sector, oil refining, 
and the production of building materials. In addition, it was proposed 
that the price of natural gas and electricity for local residents be re-
duced.  
 
The construction industry is indeed a prospective growth area for the 
republic. Two brick factories have already been restored and are cur-
rently in operation, which is also the case for a linoleum production 
workshop and two woodworking shops. Work is currently being car-
ried out on rebuilding housing, roads and transport facilities. Institu-
tions related to sports, culture, health and education are also function-
ing again. 
 
Oil-industry workers are seriously concerned about the restoration of 
the oil fields. According to geologists’ estimates, proven recoverable 
reserves of oil in the republic total more than 50 million tonnes, while 
potential and projected reserves amount to more than 800 million ton-
nes. However, in order to convert potential reserves to the status of in-
place reserves, further hydrocarbon exploration is required. 
 
In May 2005, at a government meeting in Moscow, a discussion was 
held on the achievements made in the Chechen Republic within the 
federal special-purpose programme ‘Rebuilding the economy and so-
cial sphere of the Chechen Republic (for 2002 and onwards)’. 
 
For the period 2001 to 2004, during the reconstruction work carried 
out under this programme, a total of 5191 facilities were commis-
sioned and built, as a result of which 19,072 jobs were created. The 
construction projects were not just for social purposes and municipal 
use, but also extended to facilities related to the local economy. The 
republic began to manufacture its own products. From 2005 to 2006, 
the domestic production of goods grew by 128%. Contributing to this 
was the reconstruction of the Transmash factory and the construction 
of new enterprises such as Electropult and Tekhprom, producing rein-
forced plastic pipes. The process of economic recovery has also 
reached the rural areas of the republic. 
 
The appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov to the post of President of the 
Chechen Republic led to the designation of new strategic objectives. 
‘We are moving into a stage of large-scale global change, and the 
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Chechen Republic will become an example of rapid economic growth 
for the whole of Russia,’ stated Kadyrov during the 2007 roundtable 
discussion ‘The New Economic Strategy of the Chechen Republic.’ It 
was at this venue that he pledged that the city of Grozny and the 
whole republic would be restored by the end of 2008.22 In 2007, the 
sum of 4.6 billion rubles was allocated for reconstruction work, in-
cluding 2.8 billion rubles specifically for the reconstruction of housing 
infrastructure.23 
 
Unemployment remains the sore point. By mid-2007, unemployment 
in Chechnya stood at around 312,200 people, more than two times 
higher than in the entire Southern Federal District of Russia.24 The 
path towards resolving this problem of unemployment is seen as lying 
in the recovery of local industry, small business development and, 
above all, the construction industry. Throughout the crisis in the Che-
chen Republic and up until the present day, local entrepreneurial ini-
tiative has been central in saving the republic from absolute social ca-
tastrophe. By surmounting all sorts of obstacles, the people them-
selves managed to ensure the supply of food, essential goods, etc. If 
the conditions for small business development can be established in 
Chechnya and public policies to promote it created, we can expect 
these measures to make a substantial contribution to the economic re-
covery of the republic as a sound participant in the Russian as well as 
the global economic sphere. 
 
The new federal programme ‘Socio-economic development of the 
Chechen Republic for 2008–2011’, with funding of more than 121 
billion rubles (including 110.78 billion rubles from the federal 
budget), is designed to ensure the republic’s transition from its recov-
ery phase to development. Once this programme has been imple-
mented, any funding for economic development purposes will be pro-
vided to the republic on an equal footing with other administrative-
territorial entities of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the 
complexity of the underlying conditions for the regional economy 
calls for a special approach. A major challenge here is creating condi-
tions conducive to investment. Prior to 2005, rating agencies evalu-
ated the republic’s investment attractiveness as extremely low, rating 
it as ‘ZD’ – low growth potential and extreme risk. Since then, how-
ever, the republic has succeeded in improving its position in the region 
and is now rated as having average potential and moderate risk.  
 
                                                 
22  RIA Novosti, February 19, 2007. 
23  Grozny-Inform, 5 February 2007. 
24  Vesti Republic, no. 201, 2007. 
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By 2011, it is expected that all work will be achieved in terms of re-
storing the republic’s economy, and Chechnya should be able to catch 
up with other regions of Russia in economic development. The repub-
lic should then be able to resolve its problems on its own. In effect, the 
question of the sources of funding for continuing work on the repub-
lic’s economic rehabilitation after 2011 remains open, however. 
 
The problems currently facing the people and the leadership of the 
Chechen Republic are very serious. What is needed is not for the in-
dustrial production complex to be restored, but rather that it be built 
anew. Crude oil is currently being exported instead of being processed 
on-site, and most construction materials are imported, thereby increas-
ing the cost per square meter of residential property. For the more than 
two million tonnes of oil being extracted in the Chechen Republic, the 
republic’s administration receives less than 500 million rubles. In ad-
dition, 70% of the taxes that are collected go towards the budget of the 
Russian Federation. An estimated 40 billion rubles in borrowed funds 
have been spent on construction projects in the republic. At the same 
time, thousands of citizens of the Chechen Republic continue to reside 
in other regions of Russia, as well as further abroad.25 
 
The persistence of tensions in the region and the continuing effects of 
the world financial crisis represent additional risks to the organization 
and functioning of big business, as well as hindering the inflow of in-
vestment into the republic. In essence, the normal operation of the 
economic mechanism enabling all members of society to live from 
their own labour has failed. The unemployed adult population, young 
people not least, represents a potential source of heightened social 
risk. Poverty and destitution, and the absence of the basic possibility 
for people to provide for their very livelihood through their own la-
bour are nurturing the roots of major social ills. 
 
The eventual reconstruction of some of the key facilities of the repub-
lic’s economic support infrastructure – including those in the energy 
sector (e.g. oil extraction and refining, electricity and natural gas in-
dustries), transportation and communications – can only serve as the 
foundation for building intensive economic development in the region. 
Even under the most optimistic development scenarios, these facilities 
and projects will not be able to provide work for significant numbers 
of the unemployed population. The main area of economic activity 
with considerable employment potential for the able-bodied popula-
tion is the construction of massive civil and industrial engineering pro-
jects in the republic. Such development should provide a strong impe-
tus for the growth of many local sectors of the national economy, such 
                                                 
25  History of Chechnya from ancient times to the present day. Grozny, 2008, vol. 2, pp. 824–
825. 
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as heavy industry, as well as agriculture and the services sector. It is 
unlikely that the federal government will be able to finance such activ-
ity to any significant extent. The Russian government today is simply 
unable to invest that kind of money in the economy of Chechnya. 
 
The Chechen government believes that the recent cessation of coun-
ter-terrorist operations, as of 16 April  2009, will have a positive im-
pact on the capacity to attract investment to Chechnya. This, in turn, 
should significantly improve socio-economic growth and provide a 
new impetus to the development of small and medium businesses in 
this North Caucasian republic. 
 

The Conflict between Traditional  
Islam and Wahhabism in the North 
Caucasus: 
Origins, Dynamics and the Means for 
its Resolution 
Vakhit Kh. Akayev 
 
 
 
 
The North Caucasus has become known as a conflict-ridden part of 
the Russian Federation, in large part because of the severity of the 
ethno-political conflicts found there. These conflicts are rooted in ter-
ritorial feuds, separatism, religious extremism, military operations, 
and acts of terror. In many respects, these processes are interlinked 
with the broader complex of often contradictory socio-economic, po-
litical and cultural transformations underway throughout the Russian 
Federation. 
 
The Islamic revival in the North Caucasus is a specific phenomenon. 
Its substance is driving the revival impulses of traditional Islam, 
which had, for many years, been guided by the dictates of Communist 
Party ideology and behavioural expectations. Islamic revivalism in the 
region has acquired a further distinctive aspect, linked to the penetra-
tion of radical and extremist elements not part of the traditional spiri-
tual and religious values of Islam previously seen there. At times, the-
se have been linked to the illegal activities of Salafist and Wahhabi 
groups, whose members have been occasionally referred as ‘ikhwan’ 
(‘Muslim Brothers who have forgotten their kin’). Their actions are 
described in the term ‘ikhwanism’1. 
 
This chapter describes the contradictory and conflict-driven interac-
tion between the form of Islam that is traditional to the North Cauca-
sus and the behaviour of these non-traditional religious groups, with 
its negative consequences for the Chechen nation. I examine how Is-
lam has traditionally functioned in the region, why Wahhabism even-
                                                 
1  Kh.A. Nukhayev. Vedeno or Washington? Мoscow: Artogeya Centre, 2001, pp. 113–114. 
Julie Wilhelmsen and Erika Fatland, eds 64 
tually appeared and spread throughout the North Caucasus, and the 
conflicts that have arisen between these two opposing forces. I then 
extract the distinctive features of the social and religious structure of 
Chechen society, its division into various taip (territorial associations) 
and vird (religious societies), as they form the context for the political 
and religious situation there. Finally, I inquire into the means by 
which such expressions of religious and political extremism may be 
impeded and overcome.  
How traditional Islam functions in the North Caucasus 
For the most part, the Muslims of the Russian Federation’s southern 
fringe are Sunni, and adhere to the Shafi and Hanafi schools of Is-
lamic law. There are more Sunni Muslims than Shiites in the region, 
but researchers often make inaccurate statements about their numeri-
cal correlation. For instance, in the Russian translation of Horrie and 
Chippindale’s What is Islam?, we read that ‘Sunni Muslims form the 
minority in Tatarstan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kalmykia, 
all of which are part of the Russian Federation’2. In fact, Sunni Mus-
lims form the majority in all of these constituent republics of the Rus-
sian Federation; taken together, they number about 8 million people – 
considerably more than even the Shiite population of Azerbaijan. 
 
Certain researchers, going back to the Soviet period, have suggested 
that Islam in the North Caucasus is a parallel, popular form of the faith 
that operates outside of the mosque. However, these are judgements 
based on external, formal characteristics. A distinction should be 
made, for instance, between Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, the 
Northeastern Caucasus, and the Northwestern Caucasus, which is 
made up of North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-
Cherkessk and Adygea. In the former areas, Islam, both historically 
and today, is dominated by Sufism. In the latter areas, it is closely en-
twined with elements of popular culture (including paganism), which 
have often achieved sacred status and have become objects of rever-
ence.  
 
In a 2005 publication about Wahhabism in the North Caucasus, S. 
Markedonov expressed yet another view: that, in the North Caucasus, 
traditional Islam is seen as a religion of ritual (primarily in connection 
with burial rites), which now finds itself confronted by a radical or 
‘prayerful’ Islam. That author notes that traditional Islam is not char-
                                                 
2  Chris Horrie and Peter Chippindale. What is Islam? (volume sponsored by The Observer, 
1990). Russian edition, St. Petersburg: Amfora Publishers, 2008, p. 384. [This erroneous 
statement is due, in fact, to a mistranslation from English: see the 1994 (pbk) edition, p. 
222, tr.] 
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acteristically ‘prayerful’, in contrast with the practices that have taken 
hold in the form of ‘North Caucasus Wahhabism’.  
 
As a whole, Islam in this region is a syncretic phenomenon that has 
absorbed specifically religious as well as popular components, the re-
sult being a complex mosaic or pattern within which the various ele-
ments have achieved a certain balance. The emergence and spread of 
Islam throughout the region took place in several different stages in 
different periods. The process of Islamization in Dagestan is con-
nected with the Arab conquest campaigns from the mid-8th century to 
the 10th century. As noted in one of the historical writings on this 
theme, the Arabs subjugated Dagestan ‘… in part by force, bloodshed 
and destruction, and in part by peace, through the conversion of the 
population to Islam. In this way, they came to occupy the country and 
became established in each its parts.’3 The second stage of the process 
of converting the population of Dagestan to Islam took place from the 
10th to the 16th centuries and is more connected with the activity of 
local missionaries. 
 
The initial appearance of Muslims in Chechen society can probably be 
traced back to the military campaigns carried out by 10th-century Arab 
military leaders against Caucasian pagans. Upon Tamerlane’s incur-
sion into the North Caucasus at the end of the 14th century, residents 
of the eastern part of Chechnya were subjected to total Islamization. 
However, the Chechen and Ingush people of the mountainous regions 
near the Georgian border adopted Islam much later, towards the end of 
the 18th century. The Chechen ethnographer and Russian Army cap-
tain, Umalat Laudayev, argued that Chechens adopted Islam from 
neighbouring Dagestani tribal peoples; he also identified two Muslim 
preachers – Termaola and Sheikh Bersa (Bersan) – as responsible for 
converting the Chechen people to Islam.4 The former preacher em-
ployed drastic and at times violent measures in the course of Chechen 
Islamization. This contrasts with the approach taken by the latter spiri-
tual leader, who tended to use gentler methods of a more verbal and 
persuasive nature. 
 
The active Islamization of the population of Adygea began in the 16th 
century, largely under the influence of the Crimea and Turkey. How-
ever, for the Kabardians, Shapsugs, and other Adyg peoples, the proc-
ess of conversion to Islam continued right up to the 19th century. This 
process was connected not only with influences from Turkey or on the 
                                                 
3  ‘Dagestan Chronicles. Extracts from the history of Dagestan, prepared by Muhammad-
Rafi, with an introduction by P.U.’ in Sbornik svedenii o kavkazskikh gortsakh, Issue 5. 
Tiflis, 1871, p. 21.  
4  Umalat Laudayev. ‘The Chechen tribe (with annotations)’ in Sbornik svedenii o 
kavkazskikh gortsakh, Issue 6. Tiflis, 1872, pp. 54–56.  
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part of its designated religious preachers, but also with Muslim leaders 
in the North Caucasus – among them, Sheikh Mansur (1732–1794), 
Imam Shamil, and his Naib, Magomed-Amin.  
 
The Sufi tradition of Islam in the Northeastern Caucasus is expressed 
through the tariqahs (pathways) of the Naqshbandiyah, Qadiriyah and 
Shazaliyah orders, each of which is based on distinctive ideas or theo-
retical sources and has its own variants of ritual. Among the theoreti-
cal sources of these tariqahs, alongside the Koran and the Sunnah of 
the Prophet Muhammad, are the Sufi treatise of Sheikh Jamalutdin of 
Kazikumukhsk,5 the Adabul-Marziya, the Tarjamat makalati ... Kun-
ta-sheikh6 (speeches and pronouncements of Kunta-hajji, published in 
1910 at the Mavrayev printworks in Temir-Khan-Shura), the Khula-
satul adab7 or ‘Sufi ethics’ of Hasan of Kakhib (1905, same printing 
house), and finally Treasure-house of blessed truths, by Said Afandi 
of Chirkey8.  
 
The rituals specific to these tariqahs are found, above all, in their per-
formance of the zikr (invocation of the name of God) which, in the 
North Caucasus, takes two forms. Adherents of the Naqshbandiyah 
perform the ‘quiet zikr’ (hufiya) without loud exclamations or exag-
gerated movements, whereas followers of the Qadiriyah perform the 
‘loud zikr’ (jahriya), dancing energetically in a circle or moving for-
wards and backwards and loudly clapping their hands (or beating a 
drum, an activity which Chechens term zhirgla). Among those who 
follow the Qadiriyah, there are also those who play a two-stringed in-
strument known among the Chechens as the lad khlokkhu pondar. 
 
All three tariqahs can be found in Dagestan. In Chechnya and In-
gushetia, only the Naqshbandiyah and Qadiriyah are known to func-
tion; they are further divided into sime 30-odd small religious brother-
hoods or virds. Their operation and interaction, and their often contra-
dictory relations with one another, form the backdrop to a complex 
religious and political picture. 
 
Among the virds of the Naqshbandiyah tariqah in Dagestan, Chech-
nya and Ingushetia are vird brotherhoods that carry the names of their 
respective sheikhs: Tashu-hajji, Akhmatuk-hajji, Elakh-Mullah, Ab-
                                                 
5  See Jamalutdin of Kazimukhksk, ‘Adabul Marziya’ in Sbornik svedenii o kavkazskikh 
gortsakh. Issue 5, Tiflis, 1869. This work was republished in Oxford in 1986. 
6  See Tarjamat makalati... Kunta sheikh (in Arabic). Petrovsk, 1911. Based on this source, 
in his book, ‘Sheikh Kunta-hajji: Life and Teachings’, published in 1994 in Grozny, the 
author systematized the religious and philosophical teachings of the Chechen Sufi Kunta-
hajji Kishiyev. 
7 See Hasan-Afandi, Sufi ethics (Khulasatul adab), 2000, no place of publication indicated. 
8  See Said Afandi of Chirkey, Sokrovishnitsa blagodatnikh znaniya (‘Treasure-house of 
blessed truths’). Second edition. Мoscow, 2003.  
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dul-Vakhlaba, Abdul-Aziz Shaptukayev, Deni Arsanov, Yusup-hajji, 
the Koshkeldinsky vird, Bagautdin Arsanov, Umalat-hajji, Sugaip-
Mullah, Uzun-hajji, Solsa-hajji, Suleiman-hajji, Albast-hajji, Ma-
gomed-Amin, Yangulba-hajji, Kana-hajji, Ibragim-hajji, Kosum-hajji, 
and Shamsuddin-hajji. Those who bear allegiance to the Naqshbandi-
yah tariqah in the Chechen Republic make up roughly 18% of all 
Muslims found there. The leaders of the people of Dagestan and 
Chechnya, during their battles for independence in both the Tsarist 
and Soviet periods, were followers or sympathizers of the Naqshban-
diyah tariqah. 
 
The following major vird brotherhoods of Chechen and Ingush 
sheikhs belong to the Qadiriyah tariqah: Kunta-hajji, Bamatgirei-
hajji, Batal-hajji, Chimmirzy, Ali Mitayev, Mani-Shaikha, and Vis-
hajji. The followers of the Qadiriyah tariqah in today’s Chechen re-
public greatly outnumber the adherents of the Naqshbandiyah tariqah, 
together making up about 70% of all Muslims in Chechnya. 
 
Under the Tsars, the followers of the Qadiriyah were accused of fa-
naticism after their involvement in the ‘battle of the daggers’ near 
Shali in January 1864, and persecution ensued. They were forced to 
operate in secret – an underground existence that continued right until 
the February 1917 Revolution. It was only during the early years of 
the Soviet regime in Chechnya that adherents of the Qadiriyah were 
again able to operate openly, since the new authorities regarded fol-
lowers of this tariqah as a ‘social stratum’ close to the working class 
and the peasantry (an assessment included in a confidential OGPU, or 
secret police, document). The new regime made the most out of the 
extremely poverty-stricken Qadiriyah, using them to promote its ide-
ology and policies among the poorest Chechen peasants. This coun-
tered the influence of the wealthy mullahs, merchants and landowners 
who tended to be followers of the Naqshbandiyah. There were, how-
ever, some adherents of that tariqah (such as Sugail Mullah, Ibragim-
hajji and Belu-hajji) who supported the introduction of the Soviet re-
gime in Chechnya because they too had themselves suffered at the 
hands of the Tsarist authorities.  
 
The policy of cooperation between the new authorities and Muslim 
spiritual leaders in the 1920s and 1930s subsequently became one of 
repression. ‘Counter-revolutionaries’ were sought among the region’s 
Islamic leaders; from the mid-1930s onwards, many were the victims 
of extra-judicial executions carried out by the OGPU and its succes-
sor, the NKVD. Many Muslims could not understand why they had 
been selected for elimination by the Bolshevik regime; others realized 
that their only crime in the eyes of that godless system was their belief 
in Allah. 
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In the late 1950s, the Chechen and Ingush nations returned from Cen-
tral Asia, to which they had been deported in 1944, and the Checheno-
Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored. It was the 
followers of the Naqshbandiyah tariqah, who had demonstrated their 
loyalty to the Soviet authorities, who now assumed the dominant role 
in the religious and political sphere. These spiritual leaders of the 
Chechen and Ingush people, whether openly or more discreetly sup-
ported by the Soviet authorities, were to retain this position for as long 
as the USSR continued to exist. Many Soviet and Communist Party 
officials of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR were in close contact with 
well-known leaders of the Naqshbandiyah. They enjoyed their support 
and used them in pursuit of their own private interests and in carrying 
out their tasks as the local representatives of the Soviet regime in 
Moscow. 
 
During the crisis in Checheno-Ingushetia in the summer and autumn 
of 1991, many Sufi brotherhoods were drawn into the political strug-
gles of the republic. Taking advantage of the attempted August coup 
in Moscow, the leader of the National Congress of the Chechen Na-
tion, Djokhar Dudayev, and his immediate supporters began an open 
struggle for control of Chechen territory. For this, they needed to 
enlist popular support – and they were able to attract the followers of 
Sheikh Kunta-hajji and his deputy Chimmirza.9 Yusup Soslanbekov, 
an active participant in the 1991 ‘Chechen revolution’, offers the fol-
lowing comment: ‘Dudayev was a convinced Communist who did not 
even leave the CPSU when it was declared to be a criminal organiza-
tion. He was also a confirmed atheist who announced that he was a 
member of Kunta-hajji’s vird specifically in order to secure the sup-
port of that influential brotherhood.’10  
 
When Dudayev’s regime was established, the Naqshbandiyah found 
their position undermined. From 1991 to 1994, leaders of the Qadiri-
yah, such as M. Garkayev, M. Nasukhanov and M-hajji Alsabekov, 
came to dominate the religious and political scene in the republic, pos-
ing as supporters of Dudayev and the independence of Chechnya. In 
the post-Soviet period, the muftis of the republic came exclusively 
from the vird of Kunta-hajji. This influence was further strengthened 
by the unswervingly anti-Wahhabi activities of Akhmad Kadyrov, and 
the hostility of adherents of the Qadiriyah (Zikrists) to the ideology 
and deeds of Wahhabism. 
 
                                                 
9  Chimmirza was the vekil or plenipotentiary of Kunta-hajji, who helped to spread the 
tariqah of the Qadiriyah in the form promoted by Kunta, the sheikh of the Zikrists. Sub-
sequently, Chimmirza would himself establish a vird that became popularly known as ‘the 
drummers’. 
10  Yusup Soslanbekov. Chechnya (Nokhchicho), the view from within, p. 39. 
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The vird brotherhoods of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia came 
into existence in the 19th and 20th centuries. Their founders entered 
the pantheon of saints, whose veneration has constituted a very impor-
tant part of many believers’ rituals. Nearly every vird has its own dis-
tinctive rituals and traditions concerning the life and activities of the 
Sufi teachers. There is a ziarat (mausoleum) that commemorates al-
most every founder of a vird in Chechnya and Ingushetia. For the 
faithful, such ziarats are sites for regular pilgrimage and veneration. 
 
In many respects, the situation within Islam in Chechnya and In-
gushetia is determined by the relations that have developed between 
the vird brotherhoods. In Dagestan, by contrast, the situation is shaped 
by the relations between those who are today the leaders of the Sufi 
Orders and their followers. Unavoidably drawn into politics, they of-
ten find themselves in conflict with one another. The situation is exac-
erbated by relations between the traditional and non-traditional forms 
of Islam found in the North Caucasus. 
 
The tariqah of Shazaliyah exists successfully in Dagestan thanks to 
the activities of Said Afandi of Chirkey, who is today a sheikh of two 
tariqahs – the Naqshbandiyah and the Shazaliyah. He wields a firm 
influence over the official clergy and over the political elite of the im-
portant Avar ethnic group. He is also influential within the Spiritual 
Department for the Muslims of Dagestan which has been, and re-
mains, active in its opposition to Wahhabi activities within the repub-
lic. Figures collected by several Dagestan researchers indicate that this 
Sufi sheikh has up to six thousand followers – a sizable force, capable 
of determining the further development of the religious and political 
situation in Dagestan. 
 
In today’s Chechen Republic, the most influential Qadiriyah vird is 
that of Sheikh Kunta-hajji Kishiyev. Its members include the president 
of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, the mufti and a significant propor-
tion of the clergy. There are also supporters of this vird in neighbour-
ing Ingushetia, where the Qadiriyah vird of Batal-hajji is considered 
influential although with fewer followers than the Kunta-hajji. The 
descendants of this vird are today widely represented in the power 
structures of the Ingush republic. Among the Ingush, also the vird of 
Sheikh Deni Arsanov wields considerable influence. 
 
Arsanov’s vird had great influence over the faithful during the Soviet 
period, but now finds itself displaced by the dominant followers of 
Kunta-hajji. It also has an ideological dispute with the latter, adopting 
different approaches as to the performance of religious rites. Ramzan 
Kadyrov has rebuilt the ziarat of the Naqshbandiyah sheikh Kunta-
hajji. His recent attendance at the celebration to mark its inauguration 
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in the village of Keni-Yurt was a deliberate diplomatic gesture to-
wards improving relations between the adherents of Qadiriyah and 
Naqshbandiyah. 
 
The followers of Sufism in the Northeastern Caucasus – Dagestan, 
Chechnya and Ingushetia – are Sunni Muslims who observe the fun-
damental tenets of Islam and hold close to Sufi traditions. These in-
clude the veneration of teachers (ustazi), of the sheikhs and avliyah 
known to them, the performance of the loud and the silent zikr, pil-
grimages to the shrines of the saints, and so on. 
 
As part of its centuries-long adaptation to local ethno-cultural features 
and folk culture, Islam in the North Caucasus has acquired a character 
of its own, distinguished by liberality, and tolerance towards other 
faiths. Since the end of the 1980s, however, tensions have been grow-
ing in the region, due to its penetration by a new religious doctrine 
with a pronounced political character.  
 
Among the local Muslim clergy, this new movement has come to be 
known as ‘Wahhabism’. Adherents of this teaching, however, con-
sider such a name offensive and refer to themselves as Muslims, pro-
ponents of a ‘pure’ Islam and of religious unity (tawheed). They see it 
as their duty to restore the true Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and 
the four Righteous Caliphs, by cleansing traditional Islam of local ac-
cretions, the errors of the Sufi and their followers, and elements of pa-
gan belief that have distorted the Muslim religion. The way to begin 
this process, in their view, is to make sharia part of the entire socio-
cultural reality of the Muslims of the North Caucasus. Certain re-
searchers refer to these activists as Salafists (i.e. supporters of the tra-
ditions of the earliest Muslims). Others describe them as neo-
Wahhabi, thereby distinguishing them from the adherents of 
Wahhabism, the official ideology of the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia. 
I have elsewhere referred to this phenomenon as ‘North Caucasian 
Wahhabism’, in order to highlight this distinction.11  
 
Such a term cannot provide an exhaustive account of the essence of 
this phenomenon. Only a thorough scholarly analysis is capable of 
doing that by linking this regional phenomenon with the revivalism 
occurring in those Muslim parts of the world where Salafist, funda-
mentalist and radical groups are active.  
 
All these processes can be observed among the Muslim peoples of the 
North Caucasus, including Chechens, whose religious organizations 
and social structures may be noticeably identified, in large part, by the 
                                                 
11  See V.Kh. Akayev, ‘North Caucasian Wahhabism as a variety of Islamic radicalism’, 
Nauchnaya mysl Kavkaza, 2000, no. 3 (in Russian), pp. 40–48. 
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existence of Sufi brotherhoods (virds) and taips. Researchers often 
examine Chechen virds and taips, only to produce inadequate interpre-
tations. In this process, they have considered it less relevant to focus 
on the interconnection between virds and taips in the context of the 
general religious and political situation within Chechen society. 
The interaction between Chechen virds and taips as part of 
the religious and political situation in the North Caucasus 
region 
Religious issues are not the only problems that have arisen in the 
North Caucasus. Relations between the clans that make up Chechen 
society are also relevant in any attempt to understand the current reli-
gious and political situation in the region. Researchers in Rostov-on-
Don, Moscow and St. Petersburg have attempted to trace the roots of 
the religious and political situation in Chechnya back to the social 
structure of Chechen society. They tend to reduce its present status to 
that of a society based on relations of tribe and lineage, and ignore the 
various stages of Soviet modernization experienced by the Chechen 
nation, as by many other peoples of the former USSR. Chechen soci-
ety has traditionally had strongly developed democratic and civil ele-
ments. Today it is also experiencing the formation of a market econ-
omy and the resultant social differentiation.  
 
Certain researchers, with noteworthy determination, refuse to see be-
yond the confines of the clan or taip. Here it is in order to make a few 
pertinent statements about the clans in Chechen society and the myths 
associated with them. 
 
It has become commonplace to assert that clan and taip in Chechen 
society are comparable concepts. However, the taip, which derives 
from the Arabic word taif, refers to the totality of individuals who live 
in a certain area. Its members are not necessarily bound by ties of 
blood or lineage – whereas that is the constituting factor in the defini-
tion of a clan.12 As Lechi Ilyasov rightly notes: ‘many Russian re-
searchers identify taip with clan or family and, on this basis, draw 
conclusions about the structure of Chechen society’.13  
 
Clan and taip, as social structures, have different foundations. The taip 
is neither a clan nor a tribal structure: it is an association made up of 
                                                 
12  I have written in greater detail on the subject in ‘Chechen society in search of geopolitical 
and socio-cultural identity’, Contemporary problems of Caucasian geopolitics, Yuzhno-
kavkazskoe obozrenie, Issue 5, V.V. Chernos (ed.). Rostov-on-Don: North Caucasus Re-
search Centre publishers, 2001, p. 126. 
13  Lechi Ilyasov, ‘The Chechen taip, myths and reality’, Chechenskoe obshchestvo segod-
nya, 2007, no 1 (9). 
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various clans and ethnic groups that inhabit the same territory and 
have established particular socio-cultural ties. Other journalists, gov-
ernment spokesmen and members of the power ministries (e.g. armed 
forces, law enforcement, and security agencies) divide the Chechen 
nation into those living on the plains and those living in the mountain-
ous southern regions. Such attitudes would be laughable, had they not 
been responsible for the employment policies adopted by Moscow. In 
the past, when the clan system indeed dominated society, Chechens 
resolved their common problems by summoning the Mekhkan Kkhiel, 
which, back in the Middle Ages, represented something of a national 
parliament. The term translates literally as the ‘Court of the Land’, 
though Chechen ethnologists prefer to call it the Council of the Land. 
In the past, the organizers and members of this Council were represen-
tatives of free societies (tukkhum, taip), who had gained a good repu-
tation among the people for their honesty and knowledge of adat, tra-
ditional law, and, later, of sharia. It was in times critical for the Che-
chens that the Mekhkan Kkhiel was convened – when they were 
threatened by enemy attack, during intense periods of clan strife, or 
when questions affecting the entire nation needed to be resolved. Its 
decisions were binding on every Chechen.  
 
During the Dudayev period, there was an attempt, supported by local 
ethnologists, to revive the Mekhkan Kkhiel. However, those who be-
came its members were distinguished neither by their moral nor their 
intellectual qualities. As a result, the activities of the body failed to 
receive popular recognition and support. Instead, several of its leaders 
acquired dubious fame as the subject of satire. An archaic structure 
that came into existence when the clans ruled Chechnya, the Mekhkan 
Kkhiel was artificially revived to aid Djokhar Dudayev. It soon disap-
peared, unlamented, from the political scene. 
 
Some studies include statements that make direct links between the 
taips and the virds, but these cannot be considered accurate from a 
scholarly point of view. Akhmet Yarlykanov asserts, for instance, that 
‘the virds and taips became intertwined in Chechnya and In-
gushetia’.14 Having directly observed how the taips and virds of 
Chechnya interact, I would definitely not over-emphasize their ‘inter-
twining’. Until we have established what they might share in common, 
it is difficult to understand how they might become so entwined. Re-
searchers have not expanded on the matter but, by advancing such er-
roneous evaluations and judgements, have made it more difficult to 
grasp this relationship. Even worse, these issues are still treated as 
practical, political matters. 
 
                                                 
14  Akhmet Yarlykanov, ‘The Muslims of the North Caucasus between traditionalism and 
Arabization’, Russia and Islam: a dialogue of civilizations, Moscow-Ufa, 2006, p. 150. 
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Should we perhaps try to establish the impact the taips and virds of 
Chechnya and Ingushetia have on one another? No such study has 
been conducted yet. However, that would enable us to specify how 
these two forms of social organization relate to one another. In its ab-
sence, no clear picture can be drawn, and any statement must remain 
speculation. It would appear that this question has been artificially rai-
sed. Those who study the history and culture of the Chechens do not 
consider the question as being of particularly scholarly importance – 
otherwise, a solution would long ago have been proposed and tested. 
 
The principle underlying the religious and political organization of the 
vird brotherhoods does not rely on membership of a single taip: vird 
members are usually drawn from a range of different taips. Studies 
carried out by A.A. Salamov, S.Ts. Umarov and V.Yu. Gadayev15 
during the Soviet period revealed a large number of vird brotherhoods 
(or Murid communities). These studies described the activity of these 
brotherhoods as well as the ‘sacred sites’ (ziarat) in the Chechen and 
Ingushetia regions, providing an account of their political and spiritual 
role in the lives of the faithful. However, they did not deal with the 
relationship between taips and virds, probably because they consid-
ered that it was not an issue of substance. Although these Soviet-era 
studies had an ideological bias, they also presented valuable data that 
have retained their empirical value. 
 
There are far fewer virds than taips. M. Mamakayev estimated that 
Chechen society was made up of 135 taips,16 whereas there were only 
about 30 vird brotherhoods. Some experts have estimated that the vird 
brotherhoods, as a whole, account for about 80% of the faithful. Of 
that figure, the majority (60%) belong to the Qadiriyah, among whom 
the most numerous are followers of Kunta-hajji, while 20% are adher-
ents of the Naqshbandiyah. Among the remaining Muslims, 15% do 
not belong to any of the brotherhoods, while the other 5% remain in-
different to religion. This figure is quite different from the estimate 
that I provided earlier. 
 
Despite a division between such brotherhoods, Islam can be consid-
ered as united in Chechnya. The Muslims of this region are primarily 
Sunni and belong to the Shafi school of theology and law, founded by 
                                                 
15  See A.A. Salamov, ‘The truth about “sacred sites” in Checheno-Ingushetia’, Proceedings 
of the Checheno-Ingush research institute for language and literature, Vol. 9, Grozny, 
1964; S.Ts. Umarov, ‘The changeable fate of the saints’, Nauka i religiya, no. 7, 1976; 
Umarov, The social essence of the cult of holy places, Grozny, 1983; Umarov, The evolu-
tion of the main trends in Islam in Checheno-Ingushetia, Grozny, 1985; and V.Yu. Ga-
dayev, ‘The Murid communities in Checheno-Ingushetia’, A teaching aid: the Checheno-
Ingush state pedagogical institute. Grozny, 1987. 
16  M. Mamakayev, The Chechen taip during its period of disintegration, Grozny, 1973, p. 
18. 
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Muhammad ash-Shafi. In its simplified form, this school has become 
widespread in many Muslim regions, including Dagestan, Chechnya 
and Ingushetia. However, sometimes incorrect information is pub-
lished, misrepresenting the character of the religious situation in the 
modern-day Chechen Republic. For instance, in The Great Encyclo-
paedia in 62 volumes, Chechens are grouped together with Sunni 
Muslims, while it is simultaneously stated in parenthesis that they be-
long to the Hanafites and Wahhabites as well.17  
 
This absurd statement demonstrates the authors’ lack of competence 
regarding the religious situation among Chechens. It also offends the 
religious feelings of Chechens, who have never belonged to the Hana-
fites, since they adhere to the Shafi mazhab (school of Islamic law) –
nor have they ever previously been Wahhabites. Even today,withs 
Wahhabism beginning to spread throughout the North Caucasus, the 
number of followers of this Islamic religious and political movement 
in Chechnya still amounts to less than 1% of the population. Catego-
rizing all the Chechen people as Wahhabites can be considered as re-
flecting sheer ignorance or perhaps wishful thinking, but certainly not 
reality. 
 
As for Wahhabism, it is based on the Hanbali mazhab, the fourth Sun-
ni school, known for its intolerance of innovation and its strict obser-
vance of the norms of sharia. This helps to explain the local hostility 
to Wahhabism, as it rejects the Sufi traditions followed by the major-
ity of Muslims in Chechnya. 
 
For many Chechens, loyalty to the vird brotherhoods is a historical 
tradition and a sacred aspect of their spiritual life. The spiritual and 
cultural tradition of the nation is homogeneous, although the variety of 
taips and virds often give rise to conflict situations that end up disrupt-
ing social and religious unity. The continued existence of such ancient 
social and religious institutions can be seen as an indication the socio-
cultural variety and amorphous state of Chechen society. On another 
level, however, this is not the case. When the Chechen people’s reli-
gious interests were offended and external threats arose to their exis-
tence, Chechen society mobilized and closed ranks. 
 
The role of the virds in such social and political mobilization is quite 
palpable. During political campaigns and elections, politicians seeking 
support find themselves obliged to approach the leading figures of a 
vird, who are then often able to mobilize their ‘flock’. Such authorita-
tive figures within a vird may play a crucial role in reconciling war-
ring parties, particularly feuding families. The descendants of a sheikh 
                                                 
17  Great Encyclopaedia in 62 volumes. Мoscow: Terra, 2006, p. 233.  
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or other authoritative figures within a vird frequently carry greater 
weight within Chechen society than those who lead the taip. Certain 
living descendants of Chechen holy men have more influence over the 
faithful than do the elders within the taip, as apparent in their peace-
making activities, and the role they play in resolving conflicts among 
Muslims and reconciling the opposing sides in blood feuds. Often, the 
official authorities are forced to turn to them in order to gain the sup-
port of one or another political figure. 
 
Such socio-cultural traditions have become endowed with many valu-
able aspects of universal human value. At the same time, they are not 
without their conservative side – as can easily be seen in the workings 
of any traditional society, where tradition and social innovation fre-
quently come into sharp opposition until life itself transcends the con-
tradiction. In contemporary Chechen society, religious traditions have 
played an important role in countering extremist phenomena. 
 
In popular Islam, the ethnic component is more firmly rooted than the 
religious. The believer often faces a dilemma and has to ask himself 
‘Am I a Muslim or a representative of my nation?’ This problem finds 
acute expression during the confrontation between supporters of neo-
Wahhabism and those representing traditional Islam. To neo-
Wahhabites, allegiance to one’s religion, especially to Jamat groups 
that aim to restore the Caliphate, comes before ethnic or family ties. 
Representatives of traditional Islam, on the contrary, give priority to 
their ethnic allegiance, while viewing the ideology and behaviour of 
the radicals as a threat to their own cultural and spiritual foundations. 
When Akhmad Kadyrov was mufti and, later, president of Chechnya, 
he spoke out against the deeds and ideas of Wahhabism as not being 
part of the Chechen tradition. ‘We are Chechens first,’ he declared, 
‘and then Muslims.’  
 
Ethnicity is dominant in the Chechen psychology and throughout 
much of the North Caucasus. However, those who have wanted to 
foist on them religious and ideological values that were shaped outside 
the culture and civilization of the region failed to take this into ac-
count. 
 
Some ethnographers hold that the traditionalist nature of Islam in the 
North Caucasus ‘inevitably comes up against another problem, the 
confrontation between young Muslims and those who represent the 
older generation and declare themselves defenders of “traditional” Is-
lam’.18 The response to this claim can be seen in a comment by at 
least one author: ‘the young thought up several derogatory names for 
                                                 
18  Akhmet Yarlykapov, ‘Muslims of the North Caucasus between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘Ara-
bization’ in Russia and Islam: a dialogue of civilizations, Moscow-Ufa, 2006, p. 151.  
Julie Wilhelmsen and Erika Fatland, eds 76 
their opponents. The least offensive was “ethnic” Muslims, i.e. those 
who were born Muslims but did not practice their faith. The most 
hurtful definition of “ethnic” Islam that I have heard is “funereal” Is-
lam.’19 
 
In the course of many years working with young Chechens, I have not 
heard such ‘hurtful definitions’ of traditional Islam. That is not to say 
that they and, for example, their contemporaries in Kabardia and Ka-
rachaevsk, do not criticize a number of the beliefs of popular Sufi Is-
lam. In their attempts to comprehend traditional Islam, such criticism 
is present since many have received a religious education or are in 
contact with those who are well educated. In their view, traditional 
Islam often diverges from the ideology of Salafism, i.e. Islam as it ex-
isted at the time of the Caliphs. They feel that the religion of their 
forefathers should be cleansed of innovations and errors. 
 
This example shows the influence of those non-traditional currents of 
Islam that have penetrated the North Caucasus. But the conflict also 
involves two distinct generations in the region. On the one side are the 
older generation of those Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachai 
who were deported during the war to Kazakhstan and Central Asia by 
Beria and Stalin. On the other, there is the generation who grew up in 
the 1960s to 1980s after their fathers had returned from deportation. 
Thus we may speak of clash between fathers, sons and grandsons. The 
conflict remains unresolved due to its socio-cultural and psychological 
complexity and the great loyalty that the nations of the North Cauca-
sus feel towards the traditions of their ancestors. 
 
Members of the young generations of Muslims in the region have be-
come increasingly vociferous in expressing their criticism of tradi-
tional religion (the ‘Islam of the fathers’) and proposing a return to the 
pure Islam of the Prophet Muhammad’s time. Such rebellious youth 
find their way into Jamatist or Wahhabi groups led by local or foreign 
emirs, and become opposed not only to traditional Islam but also to 
the secular authorities. This renders them subject to persecution by the 
armed forces, law enforcement agencies and security services which, 
seeking to extirpate Wahhabism, organize literal manhunts for such 
individuals. These youth have been accused of carrying out anti-
national activities and committing acts of terrorism in the North Cau-
casus.  
 
Such is the complexity and conflict-driven nature of the religious and 
political situation in the North Caucasus. It forms part of the wider 
movements of Islamic revivalism in Russia characteristic of the late 
                                                 
19  Ibid.  
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20th and early 21st centuries. Stability will be achieved not be through 
force, but through lengthy efforts to establish dialogue between those 
representing traditional Islam and those representing the Salafist, 
Wahhabi or Jamatist groups. Today, the latter operate underground, 
exercising what is often a criminal-like influence over the youth of 
Chechnya and the other Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus. 
 
The emergence of ‘North Caucasian Wahhabism’ and its 
dangers 
Wahhabism in the North Caucasus is a specific phenomenon, both in 
religious and political terms. It a regional form of the Salafism ideol-
ogy, which calls Muslims to return to the so-called ‘pure’ Islam of the 
times of the Prophet Muhammad and the Four Righteous Caliphs. 
This ideology holds that it can achieve this ‘pure’ state by cleansing 
traditional Islam of local accretions, of the mis-persuasions and here-
sies of the Sufi and adherents of the tariqahs, as well as elements of 
pagan beliefs which its adherents claim have distorted the Muslim re-
ligion. Some scholars have described the religious programme of 
Wahhabism in the North Caucasus as fundamentalism. That term may 
be applied, with certain reservations, but it is not itself of Islamic ori-
gin. 
 
The source of the appearance and spread of North Caucasian Wahha-
bism can be traced back to the era of perestroika and glasnost, when 
the weakening of Communist ideology permitted a gradual process of 
‘re-Islamization’. Religious schools and centres sprung up every-
where, the Muslim clergy started to play a more active part in reli-
gious and political activities, and previously inaccessible religious lit-
erature began to emerge once again. At rallies of Muslims in the cities 
of Makhachkala, Grozny and Karachaevsk, speakers criticized a secu-
lar society that had turned its back on divine commandments, and 
urged Muslim society to live in strict accordance with sharia. In the 
early 1990s, representatives of the Islamic Party of Revival declared, 
in Lenin Square in the centre of Grozny, that the Koran should be the 
Muslims’ constitution. 
 
The following parallel seems appropriate. In the late 1920s, members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt issued the rallying cry ‘The Ko-
ran is our constitution’, which was then adopted by the Islamist mo-
vement. Gilles Kepel notes, ‘They thereby let it be known that, in ac-
cordance with another of their slogans, “Islam is a full and complete 
system” that the Koran embodied the foundations of order in soci-
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ety.’20 The Islamic renaissance of the early 20th century in some Mus-
lim countries and its underlying ideology were, to a certain extent, re-
peated at the end of that century, albeit often with certain distinctive 
local features. 
 
The Islamic renaissance in the North Caucasus was accompanied by 
the formation of religious parties and movements that aroused interest 
and support among the region’s Muslims. In Dagestan, Chechnya and 
other parts of the USSR, branches of the Islamic Party of Revival 
(IPR), founded in Astrakhan in 1990, began to appear. Representatives 
of the traditional clergy referred to members of this party as ‘Wahha-
bites’ because the IPR spoke out against traditional Islam and its cult 
of saints. In turn, the non-traditionalists accused the official clergy of 
supporting a corrupt regime, failing to stand up for the rights of ordi-
nary Muslims, and falling away from the principles of Islamic justice. 
The IPR was the only Islamic organization in the Soviet Union to 
speak with clarity about the position of Muslims in the USSR and 
their future prospects, which indicates that its ideologues had given 
some thought to their analysis of the situation. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the official Commu-
nist ideology created a moral and intellectual vacuum that was filled 
with various doctrines, among which were Islamic currents that in-
cluded radical and extremist tendencies. As stated by the Dagestani 
scholar K.M. Khanbabayev, ‘From the late 1980s onward, illegal reli-
gious political groupings with a fundamentalist Islamic outlook 
emerged in a number of towns and districts in Dagestan and Chech-
nya. Later, this trend would be referred to as Wahhabism.’21 As a re-
sult of their activities and a power struggle within the clergy, the Mus-
lim community of the North Caucasus split into factions. In *1994, a 
Spiritual Directorate was set up for the Muslims of the entire region 
with its headquarters in Makhachkala. Since then, six such independ-
ent departments have emerged, covering Dagestan, Checheno-
Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-
Cherkessk. In turn, the Dagestan spiritual department split into several 
petty ethnic groupings.22 The Wahhabites were actively involved in 
these developments, criticizing the actions of the official clergy for 
corruption and collaboration with the Communist regime. 
                                                 
20  Gilles Kepel, Jihad, expansion et déclin de l'Islamisme. Paris: Gallimard, 2000. Russian 
edition Moscow: Ladomir Publishers, 2004, p. 33. 
21  K.M. Khanbabayev, ‘Stages in the spread of Wahhabism in Dagestan’, in Alimy i uchenye 
protiv Wahhabisma (Religious teachers and scholars against Wahhabism). Makhachkala, 
2001, p. 105. 
22  R.G. Gadjiev, ‘Wahhabism: the problems of religious extremism in the Republic of 
Dagestan’, in The religious factor in the life of contemporary Dagestan society: Materials 
of the republic-wide conference (27 October 2000). Makhachkala: Novy den Publishers, 
2002, p. 196. 
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Various interlinked Jamatist groups also came into existence in the 
North Caucasus. Each had its own structure and formed part of the 
Jamat of a given region. Young people, often from less well-off fami-
lies, were drawn into such groups, which were generally financed 
from abroad. Members received the fundamentals of a religious up-
bringing and were taught to wage polemical campaigns against their 
opponents. Later, they would also be trained to fight and perform acts 
of sabotage in camps set up by the Arab Khattab. At the head of the 
Jamat was the Emir, who combined the functions of both a religious 
and secular leader. There were cases when young men under the influ-
ence of the Jamat were ordered by the Emir to kill their own close 
relatives. 
 
After the 1991 coup that brought Djokhar Dudayev to power in the 
Checheno-Ingush ASSR, representatives of an ‘independent Chech-
nya’ strengthened their position in the republic’s newly-established 
administration. Many of them had come under the influence of the po-
litical and religious radicalism and extremism promoted by the re-
gion’s Wahhabis. From 1992 onwards, their activities took on an ac-
tive ideological and, later, political and military character in the re-
named ‘Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’. To begin with, they espoused 
the idea of monotheism and denied the cult of saints, declaring that 
there should be no intermediaries (among which they numbered the 
saints revered in the Sufi tradition) between the Almighty and the 
faithful. Wahhabism was thereby transformed into an alternative to 
traditional Islam, with its own ideology, way of life and patterns of 
behaviour. Yet in this period, the activities of the Wahhabites in the 
North Caucasus as a whole did not really extend beyond a limited 
criticism of traditional Islam. 
 
It was with the beginning of the first war in Chechnya in December 
1994 that religion started to gain a stronger hold on the public imagi-
nation, as Islamic slogans became prominent in the rhetoric of Che-
chen separatists. The first mufti of Ichkeria, M-hajji Alsabekov de-
clared a holy war or gazavat against Russia. Later, finding himself in 
Znamenka at the centre of the Chechen opposition to the new leader-
ship in Grozny, he was to retract that declaration, explaining that he 
had said this under pressure from Dudayev. For this, he was punished 
on 20 August 1996 by the Ichkerian sharia court with 80 strokes of 
the cane.  
 
During the first Chechen war, Islamic units, including a women’s sha-
ria battalion, were formed to resist the federal Russian army. The war 
led to a marked radicalization of Islam in Chechnya. Chechens took 
part in military engagements by defending their villages, towns and 
the republic from the intervening federal forces. Hardly anyone saw 
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the Russian troops as saviours delivering them from the unpopular 
Dudayev regime. They were not alone in this fight, however. ‘Arab 
mercenaries’, led by Khattab, also somehow found their way to the 
republic and fought in Ichkeria. In 1995, in the southern town of Sha-
toi, Akhmad Kadyrov was chosen mufti of the republic on the recom-
mendation of Dudayev. In line with Alsabekov, he also declared gaza-
vat against the federal troops. Later, when he became president of 
Chechnya, Kadyrov would repeatedly assert that the first war had in-
deed been a holy war or gazavat; the second campaign, however, was 
nothing of the kind. This was probably because Kadyrov, as mufti, 
was highly critical of the behaviour of the Wahhabites on the eve of 
the second war. He called on President Maskhadov to expel them from 
Chechnya and send Khattab and his fighters back home to Palestine. 
 
After the first war ended, secular courts in Chechnya were disbanded 
in October 1996 by the acting president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, and 
the Supreme Sharia Court of Ichkeria was established, along with a 
network of district courts. For several years, many conflicts of a cri-
minal and civil character came before these tribunals. That period was 
also marked by an Islamization of the social and cultural life of the 
nation. However, society as a whole was not prepared for such a dras-
tic turn of events nor the activities of the sharia courts and the meth-
ods employed in Islamizing the nation. These included a total imple-
mentation of sharia, which was not popular among Chechens and only 
served to deepen the contradiction between the traditional culture and 
the whole-scale introduction of sharia by the Wahhabis. 
 
Meanwhile, representatives of traditional Islam were being pushed to 
the margins of public life. This intensified their negative attitude to-
wards the Wahhabis, who were both limiting their influence over 
Chechen society and trying to discredit them in the eyes of the faith-
ful. Seeing that the traditional clergy were opposed to its power, the 
authorities in Ichkeria wanted to form a new clergy from the ranks of 
the religious radicals who held pronounced anti-Russian attitudes.  
 
The ideology and activities of the ‘North Caucasian Wahhabites’ were 
effectively directed against the virds or religious brotherhoods. This 
mobilized the traditional clergy against the Wahhabis, further deepen-
ing the local conflict within Islam. 
 
The religious extremists pursued wide-ranging goals. First, they in-
tended to create a united Islamic state, embracing Ichkeria and Dages-
tan, ultimately aiming for a Caucasian caliphate. Their plans proved 
treacherous and criminally disastrous for the Chechen nation. On 2 
August 1999, only six months after Aslan Maskhadov had introduced 
a totally sharia-dominated administration in Chechnya, the armed 
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bands of Khattab, Shamil Basayev and Magomed Tagayev invaded 
the mountain area of Dagestan (Botlikh and Tsumadinsky districts) 
from Chechen territory. The Islamic opposition in Dagestan an-
nounced the creation of the Islamic Republic of Dagestan, the election 
of its supreme body, the Islamic Shura of Dagestan, and the formation 
of a government headed by Siradjin Ramazanov. From the statements 
made by Ramazanov, it was clear that he and his supporters had been 
preparing to seize power in the republic for a decade; further, that the 
‘liberation’ of Dagestan’s mountain region was a jihad aimed at liber-
ating all of Dagestan, and then the entire North Caucasus, from the 
power of the infidel (kufr).23 Public statements by other Dagestani op-
position figures, in particular Bugautdin Kebedov, Adalo Aliev and 
Magomed Tagayev, confirmed this. Shortly before, in an interview 
with the daily newspaper Kommersant, N. Khachilayev had expressed 
the necessity of a gazavat or holy war against bankrupt systems of 
administration that fostered deception and lies.24 
 
There was dissatisfaction among certain sectors of the population and 
the religious radicals in Dagestan with the activities of the exception-
ally corrupt Dagestani administration. An opposition was formed, 
which required powerful support from the armed radical and extremist 
groups then in Ichkeria. There can be no doubt that the provocative 
intervention of the North Caucasian Wahhabis led to the second war 
in Chechnya, a conflict with far graver consequences for the Chechen 
nation than even the first war of 1994–1996.  
Conflict between religious tradition and innovation 
Antagonistic relations between traditional Islam and the regional 
Wahhabism of the North Caucasus developed in the period immedi-
ately after the first Chechen war. The Dagestani Wahhabis established 
an Islamic enclave in the villages of the Kadar zone (Karamakhi, Cha-
banmakhi and Durguli), where sharia was introduced and used to pun-
ish and discourage theft, the drinking of spirits and other improper be-
haviour. This was their protest against corruption and what they saw 
as the moral degradation of secular society. There were regular dis-
putes and clashes between the official authorities and the religious 
radicals, at times leading to bloodshed. 
 
In Chechnya, meanwhile, those who represented separatist and radical 
ideologies gained a firmer hold on power. Their position had strength-
ened during the first war with the creation of sharia courts, attempts to 
impose a total Islamization on the social and cultural life of the Che-
                                                 
23  Quoted in V.Kh. Akaev, ‘North Caucasian Wahhabism as a kind of Islamic radicalism’, 
Scientific Caucasian Thought. 2000 (3), p. 46. 
24  See Kommersant, 11 February 1999. 
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chen nation, and efforts to ‘cleanse’ society of its Soviet background. 
The ideology and actions of ‘North Caucasian Wahhabism’ were spe-
cifically directed against the vird brotherhoods in Chechnya, and that 
gave rise to conflicts within Islam. 
 
Some of the vird brotherhoods played a direct role in the political 
events of the early 1990s by supporting Djokhar Dudayev, the separa-
tist leader. There were also those who were directly opposed to Du-
dayev, considering his actions  harmful to the nation. This led to their 
persecution by the newly established regime. Among the persecuted 
were the followers of the Deni Arsanov vird, which exercised signifi-
cant influence among the faithful of the Nadterechny district of the 
Chechen Republic as well as among the neighbouring Ingush. The 
traditional Chechen clergy were, for the most part, adherents of the 
Naqshbandiyah tariqah and did not recognize the gazavat proclaimed 
against the federal Russian forces in autumn 1994 by Dudayev and the 
Mufti Alsabekov. 
 
The vird brotherhoods did not avoid confrontation with the Wahhabis. 
For instance, the brotherhoods of Tashu-hajji and Kunta-hajji had a 
bloody encounter with the Wahhabis in Gudermes on 14 June 1998, 
after which the latter retreated to Urus-Martan. There, they enforced 
sharia law until August 1999. The Wahhabis provoked indignation 
among the population by forcing women who did not meet sharia 
standards of modesty to get off local buses. 
 
Supporters of Wahhabism were distinguished by their long beards and 
hair, trimmed moustaches and shortened, folded trousers. These were 
not accepted by representatives of traditional Islam, who followed 
their own distinctive patterns of dress and behaviour. The reforms in-
troduced by the Wahhabites were regarded negatively by traditional-
ists and became the butt of all kinds of local jokes. 
 
E.F. Kisriyev suggests that ‘Dagestani Wahhabism should be seen as a 
reforming, modernist trend in Islam while it is the followers of tariqah 
in Dagestan and the closely connected representatives of the tradi-
tional, orthodox clergy (the mullahs and imams serving the cult in the 
mosques) who have been stirred into action as a response and in every 
respect display a fundamentalist character.’25 This point of view is de-
batable. The assertion that it is the followers of the tariqahs and the 
traditional clergy who are the fundamentalists appears inaccurate. In-
deed, the term ‘fundamentalism’ has no purpose in this setting: it is 
more appropriate for the North Caucasian Wahhabites than for those 
representing forms of Islam traditional to the region. 
                                                 
25  E.F. Kisriyev, Islam and the authorities in Dagestan. Moscow: OGI, 2004, p. 109. 
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Kisriyev’s position is echoed in the work of some Moscow scholars, 
who regard the Wahhabis as reformers within Islam who purportedly 
aim to purify the religion of elements of popular culture, including old 
beliefs that have allegedly contaminated the faith. The actions of the 
Wahhabis in the North Caucasus, however, show that, in modern-day 
circumstances, their ‘reforming stance’ is actually a step backwards, 
towards the obscurantism of mediaeval times and all that this entails. 
 
The radicalism of the local Wahhabis and their call for an endless ji-
had against the infidel has proven unacceptable to the traditions of the 
North Caucasus. There, Islam had taken shape in accordance with the 
ethno-cultural features of the region. Over a lengthy period, stretching 
from the Tsarist era to the post-Soviet epoch, it has adapted in both 
social and religious terms. The conflict between the Wahhabis and 
their opponents in the North Caucasus was, therefore, not just a theo-
logical and political confrontation, but also a clash of social and cul-
tural attitudes. It was not so much a question of two forms of Islam as 
of a clash between Caucasian culture and Arabo-Semitic culture. 
However hard the Wahhabis have tried to make Chechen women 
adopt the veil (paranja), for example, they have not succeeded in im-
posing such attire on those who are not accustomed to concealing their 
faces but prefer their own traditional form of dress. 
 
As a whole, we may define the Wahhabism foisted on the Muslims of 
the region in the late 20th century as a way of understanding Islam 
that prescribes a pattern of social and cultural behaviour onto the be-
liever. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional forms of Islam ob-
served by the people of the North Caucasus, whether we are speaking 
about the relevant religious concepts, behaviour, the forced introduc-
tion of sharia, or the dress and appearance required of men and wo-
men. The resultant conflict situation is the main reason for hostility 
towards Wahhabism among the nations and ethnic groups in the re-
gion. 
 
The conflict is not over. It runs deep and the two sides now have sco-
res to settle. In the words of Sultan Mirzayev, the mufti of the Che-
chen Republic:  
 
Since 1997, the murders of more than twenty well-known religious 
teachers are linked to the activities of the Wahhabis in Chechnya. 
Moreover, they were killed in the most merciless fashion, often being 
tortured to death in front of their own families. The crimes that have 
been committed by the Wahhabites include the burning of people’s 
homes and the execution of individuals, including innocent children.26 
                                                 
26  Sultan Mirzayev, ‘Counter-acting Wahhabism and reviving Islam are the key tasks of the 
Muslim clergy in the Chechen Republic’, Islaman zlanarsh, 27 August 2007, p. 2. 
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He goes on to cite instances when ‘Wahhabites’ have murdered the 
faithful even as they were reciting the Koran. 
 
The Wahhabites are today forced to operate underground, where they 
continue as armed resistance to the authorities. They have deprived 
themselves of the opportunity to use ideological and political means to 
openly promote their standpoint. Nevertheless, in Dagestan and 
Chechnya they continue their activities, albeit relatively muted.  
Many young men who support Wahhabism visit mosques and take 
part in Friday prayers but no longer observe certain additional ele-
ments of the obligatory religious ritual performed by traditionalists. 
This serves to fuel the conflict between traditionalists and non-
traditionalists, but the principle of coexistence among the faithful, 
though they may be adherents of different tendencies within Islam, is 
still observed in the mosque. 
How religious extremism is thwarted and defeated 
Many terrorist acts in the North Caucasus have, with reason, been lin-
ked to the radical and extremist activities of Wahhabi and Jamatist 
groups not traditional to the region. The authorities were therefore fa-
ced with the necessity of developing means for obstructing and 
thwarting the ideology and activities of the neo-Wahhabis. Part of the 
arsenal of their ‘blocking technology’ has been the use of various leg-
islative and propaganda measures, backed by the support of the offi-
cial clergy as represented by the Spiritual Departments of the region. 
 
In Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and the Karachaevo-Cherkessk 
Republic, representative and executive bodies have passed legislative 
acts banning the extremist activities of the Wahhabis. Special police 
and other units have been formed to enforce these laws and regula-
tions, acting to stem religious and extremist activities, and pre-
empting the terrorist threats that have occasionally arisen as a result of 
religious and political extremism. Today, such units exist in Dagestan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia and other republics of the North Caucasus. 
 
The President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has repeatedly stated in 
public that he will do everything to root out ‘Wahhabism’, and he has 
taken decisive measures to oppose religious extremism and terrorism 
in the republic. This position is supported by the muftis of Chechnya, 
headed by Sultan Mirzayev, who have been waging a propaganda 
campaign against local Wahhabis and transplanted agitators from out-
side  the region. The muftis of the other North Caucasus republics 
(Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachaevo-
Cherkessk) have been carrying out similar work. This involves not 
just the use of the media but also the targeting of various audiences, 
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including researchers and academics. In their daily preaching to the 
faithful, the traditionalists urge Muslims to unite and focus on spiritual 
matters, while condemning practices like taking drugs and other sinful 
acts. 
 
The intense revival of traditional Islam in the North Caucasus finds 
expression not only in the building of mosques and religious schools. 
The spiritual education of teenage and young adult Muslims reduces 
the effect of criticism by the radicals that the traditionalists are remote 
from the needs of the faithful, the problems of the young and so on.  
 
In Gudermes in 2007 and in Grozny in 2008, two conferences were 
held as part of an international peacemaking forum, ‘Islam, a religion 
of peace and construction’. This forum was of great significance for 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Rus-
sia as a whole. The speakers focused on the humane, peace-loving and 
creative role of Islam. They condemned radical and extremist activi-
ties pursued under the cover of religious slogans, and spoke of the ne-
cessity of a dialogue between believers of different faiths. This posi-
tion was supported by the muftis of Dagestan, Chechnya and Kara-
chaevo-Cherkessk, who delivered major addresses that reflected the 
place and role of traditional Islam in attaining peace and concord in 
society. Their speeches also criticized the activities of radical and ex-
tremist groupings and the terror and violence they had provoked in the 
North Caucasus. 
 
At the end of these meetings, a resolution was adopted, addressed to 
President Putin, leaders of the world community and religious figures. 
Forum participants called on ‘people of good will, religious and po-
litical leaders, nations and countries, government and non-
governmental bodies and the world community as a whole to direct 
their efforts towards the strengthening of peace throughout the world. 
We call on them to resolve the problems of mankind’s survival, to 
prevent international and religious conflicts and to eliminate pov-
erty.’27 The resolution underlined that ‘Islam is an ally to the whole 
world community in the resolution of these problems’.28 
 
The Muslims of the Chechen Republic, and the official clergy as rep-
resented by the muftis, headed by Sultan Mirzayev, approve and sup-
port the efforts of the President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov in re-
storing the republic’s economy and its social infrastructure, as well as 
reviving the spiritual foundations of the Chechen nation. Emphasizing 
President Kadyrov’s activities in restoring traditional Islam in the 
                                                 
27  Islaman zlanarsh (The dawn of Islam), 27 August 2007, p. 3. 
28  Ibid.  
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Chechen Republic, Sultan Mirzayev noted that it was thanks to the 
president that  
 
more than three hundred mosques have been built in a short period, as 
well as the magnificent building of the Islamic Institute and more than 
twenty madrasahs, while cemeteries and ziarats have been recon-
structed and the roads leading to them have been rebuilt. In Grozny, 
the largest mosque in Europe is under construction, and work is being 
completed on the three-storey Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of 
the Chechen Republic and the Islamic Library.29 
 
At President Kadyrov’s meeting with the King of Saudi Arabia in 
Mecca in late October 2007, the monarch approved the president’s 
actions against religious radicals and said that it was his duty as the 
country’s leader to take harsh measures to counteract religious ex-
tremists and terrorists in order to restore security in the Chechen Re-
public. As an adherent of traditional Islam, Ramzan Kadyrov received 
the blessing of an authoritative religious political figure in the Muslim 
world, and that has served to strengthen his position in Russia and 
among Muslims worldwide. 
 
A major Islamic complex has been built in the centre of Grozny. It 
includes the Akhmad Kadyrov Central Mosque, the mufti’s building, 
and the Kunta-hajji Kishiyev Russian Islam University, which opened 
in 2009. The inauguration ceremony for the latter was attended by rep-
resentatives from Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Mus-
lim countries. In his address at the opening of this institution, Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin underlined the significance of this 
event for the social and spiritual life of Russia, and the necessity of 
preparing Muslim clerics on the basis of traditional values that can 
resist manifestations of religious extremism. Today, this Islamic Uni-
versity has as many as 200 students, who study on the basis of the tra-
ditional Islamic values that have spread throughout the North Cauca-
sus.  
Conclusions 
The appearance of Islamic radicalism and extremism in the North 
Caucasus is linked to the active political rise of Wahhabism. There 
can be no doubt that this was prompted by the transition from one so-
cio-political formation to another within the region, the collapse of the 
USSR, the disappearance of Communist ideology, the beginning of 
democratic change, and the weakness of the political and administra-
tive system that subsequently emerged in Russia. 
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Traditional Islam in the North Caucasus, including Chechnya, is a 
symbiosis of two traditions – one Muslim, and one ethnically-based. A 
general characterization of local faith as Islamic must also take into 
account its ties with popular culture – including Sufi traditions, the 
functioning of the vird brotherhoods, and the existence of folk beliefs. 
These are the foundations of the spiritual culture of each nation and 
determine the religious and political situation in each society. 
 
During the period of political instability in the North Caucasus, the 
Wahhabis attempted, through armed resistance and terrorist acts, to 
establish a Caucasian Caliphate. Representatives of traditional Islam 
showed themselves to be supporters of the territorial integrity of the 
Russian State and took measures to defuse the threats to state and so-
ciety that emanated from their religious and political opponents. How-
ever, the religious extremists did not accept such a pro-Russian policy. 
It diverged from their lofty goals of imposing sharia in the North 
Caucasus and establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the entire 
region. For this reason, they suppressed representatives of traditional 
Islam, well aware that their often bitter experience of dealing with the 
secular authorities, especially the atheist regime of the Soviet period, 
made them open opponents of such a hazardous religious and political 
venture. 
 
A chief object of Wahhabi enmity were the religious and, subse-
quently, political activities of Akhmad Kadyrov – first as mufti and 
then as president of the Chechen Republic. Denouncing Wahhabi be-
haviour in Chechnya when Aslan Maskhadov was president, Kadyrov 
stated that training camps were being set up in various parts of the 
country, under the guise of madrasahs. The fighters came not so much 
from Chechnya as from elsewhere in the CIS, from neighbouring 
North Caucasian republics, Middle Eastern states and even from the 
USA and Britain. In his view, the republic was being transformed into 
a centre for international terrorism, and the leaders of the Chechen 
Wahhabis had established close contacts with Osama bin Laden,30 
who was generously financing any and every project that would see 
Chechnya transformed into a spear pointing at the heart of Russia. Ta-
king up his father’s cause, Ramzan Kadyrov has been using all means 
to counteract the extremist and terrorist activities still encountered in 
the North Caucasus.  
 
The Islamic revival now underway in the North Caucasus, especially 
in contemporary Chechnya, is a complex process with many facets. It 
mixes clearly positive trends towards peace, constructive work and 
                                                 
30  In referring to Wahhabi leaders who were in close contact with bin Laden, Kadyrov 
chiefly had in mind Abdurakhman, Khattab, Basayev, Udugov, Yandarbiev and Khali-
mov.  
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concord within society with forces pulling in the opposite direction. 
These latter forces have led to conflict, violence and destabilization of 
the social and political situation in the region, as is evident from the 
activities of the so-called Wahhabites. The latter tendency, however, is 
now clearly on the wane, thanks to to the measures implemented by 
the federal authorities in the North Caucasus and the antagonism dem-
onstrated by the peoples of this region to extremism and terrorist acts. 
 
A complete end to such a threat will depend on the development of 
our religious culture and freedom of belief, as well as an implacable 
attitude on the part of society against radicalism and extremism in any 
form. We must use the power of the law and the creation of firmly 
grounded civil rights to achieve genuine democratic change. And fi-
nally, the threat will end when Chechnya can at last overcome the 
economic problems linked with high unemployment levels, and im-
prove the well-being of its people. 
 
